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Japanese Banking Reform and the
Occupation Legacy:
Decompartmentalization, Deregulation, and
Decentralization
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*
Since the end of the occupation in 1952, Japan has had in place a
rigidly compartmentalized banking system. Banks were divided by fund-
ing source, by activity, and by geography. City banks, the Japanese
equivalent of money center banks, had extensive branch networks and
raised a large portion of funds through deposits. They could not, however,
sell bonds or otherwise access long term funding.
Long term banks, in contrast, could sell bonds but could not solicit
retail deposits. Trust banks, along with insurance companies, managed
pension plan assets. Regional banks, particularly those in rural areas, had
a monopoly over the prefecture in which they operated. Finally, a rigid
separation existed between banks and securities companies.
Compartmentalization had considerable significance. It facilitated
government control of the financial system. It also effectively limited the
ability of foreign banks to compete. Until the mid-1980s, U.S. banks
could not engage in a full range of financial activities within Japan. They
could not engage in trust1 or securities activities,2 had no right to issue
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; Of Counsel, Hol-
land & Hart, Denver, Colorado; B.A. 1978, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1980, Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law; M.A. 1984, Georgetown University, Ph.D 1993, Georgetown
University. This article was made possible through the funding provided by the Hughes
Research and Development Fund.
1. The Japanese government did issue nine trust licenses to foreign banks following the
Yen/Dollar Accord in 1984. The Ministry of Finance, however, made clear that no new li-
censes would issue until Japanese commercial banks received comparable authority. POLITI-
CAL DECISION: NINE FOREIGN BANKS ALLOWED INTO TRUST BANKING FIELD, THE JAPANESE
EcON. JOUR., July 2, 1985. at 1.
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bonds and lacked the branch network to access retail deposits.'
With an almost manicured appearance, therefore, the banking system
resembled a Japanese garden, "rigorously tended and artfully arranged,
with each component fixed in place and all parts combining to form an
agreeably harmonious role.' 4 Although the numbers and relative market
share of each category shifted over time, the essential divisions did not.
The compartmentalized system of city, long-term, trust and regional
banks and securities firms remained intact for 30 years.
In 1992, however, the Diet took a major step toward bringing the
Japanese financial system into closer alignment with other industrial
countries.5 Legislation provided the mechanism for ending the compart-
mentalized financial system by eliminating the distinctions between most
classes of financial institutions.6 The laws enabled banks to engage in se-
curities activities and securities firms to engage in banking activities.7
2. In 1986, the Ministry of Finance allowed foreign banks to engage in securities activi-
ties through a separate subsidiary. The bank, however, could not own more than 50% of the
subsidiary, resulting in some odd pairings. Morgan Guaranty, for example, owned half of the
shares of a securities company with Bechtel owning the other half. Barbara Buell, Deregula-
tion: A Two Way Street, Bus. WK., June 22, 1987.
3. Through the post-occupation period, the Ministry of Finance prohibited the expan-
sion of foreign banks. No new license was issued to a U.S. bank already in the country until
1981 when Citibank received approval to open two additional branches. The restrictions
have largely ended. Citibank, the only foreign financial institution to take advantage of the
authority, now has approximately 20 branches. Letter from John J. Skelly, Vice President
Citibank (April 1991) (providing opening dates of all Citicorp branches in Japan).
4. EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT, Aug., 1986, at 21.
5. European financial institutions operate under a system of universal banking. This
enables banks to engage in a host of related financial activities such as the sale of securities
and insurance. While the United States still separates the banking, insurance and securities
industry, those barriers have been lowered through administrative legerdemain. The Federal
Reserve Board has, for example, permitted banks to engage in securities underwriting. See
In re J.P. Morgan, Etc., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1987). Similarly, banks have made some
inroads into the insurance industry. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. App.
1988). Japan's reforms reflect this international trend toward the reduction of barriers sepa-
rating classes of financial institutions.
6. Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law originally prohibited banks from en-
gaging in securities activities. Article 65-3 now authorizes the Ministry of Finance to issue
securities licenses to companies owned by banks. Article 43-2 now authorizes the Ministry of
Finance to allow securities firms to acquire a majority of a banking subsidiary.
See Amendment [Bill] to the Securities and Exchange Law (Pt. I), CaMRI Review No. 25,
Apr. 30, 1992.
7. Specifically, Article 43-2 provides that "[any securities company may, upon authori-
zation by the Minister of Finance, acquire or held a majority of shares or a majority of
equity contribution ... of a bank, trust company, or such other financial institutions in a
foreign country, a foreign company which is engaged in the securities business or such other
companies as may be prescribed by an ordinance of the Ministry of Finance." Article 65-2
provides that "[t]he provisions of Article 65 [prohibiting banks from engaging in securities
activities] shall not preclude the Minister of Finance from issuing a license . . .to a joint
stock company in which a bank, trust company, or such other financial institution as may be
prescribed by a Cabinet order owns a majority of its shares."
While allowing banks and securities firms to enter each other's business, including trust
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Moreover, securities firms and commercial banks could operate trust
subsidiaries.'
The change portended more than a realignment in the classification
of banks. The shift promised to accelerate the process of consolidation
and a return to the pre-war system dominated by a handful of large city
banks.9 Moreover, over the long term, decompartmentalization should re-
duce the government's ability to micro-manage the financial markets.
Less obvious, the changes essentially eviscerated a regulatory ap-
proach developed by United States and more or less imposed on Japan
during the occupation. Allied officials, over the initial opposition of the
Japanese government, wanted to segment the financial system, primarily
to prevent the large Japanese city banks from absorbing smaller competi-
tors."0 Compartmentalization, therefore, had its roots in U.S. policies. The
exegesis was even more notable given the role of compartmentalization a
critical barrier to foreign banking activity in the country.
I. PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT
The Japanese financial system changed considerably after the Second
World War. To be sure, certain characteristics of the pre-war system re-
mained. Both periods saw some degree of segmentation. The distinction
between long term and ordinary commercial banks predated the war. So
did the highly consolidated nature of the banking system, something that
had begun in ernest following financial panics in the 1920s.
When the occupation ended in 1952, however, the banking system
had changed in a number of material respects. Trust companies had con-
verted to banks. Securities and banking functions were separated. Special
banks were eliminated.
These changes resulted in compartmentalization of the banking sys-
tem, something that enhanced government control. Designed to facilitate
economic recovery, the financial system did not allocate capital through
market forces. Instead, capital went where the government thought best.
Targeted industries benefitted from a constant supply of funds while
banking, barriers continued to remain following the legislation. Long term banks still had
the exclusive right to issue bonds and debentures to the public. Commercial banks could
raise long term funds only through private placements. Otherwise they were limited to short
term funds, particularly deposits. In addition, the legislation did not tamper with the barri-
ers separating financial institutions and the insurance industry, although change in that
area is under study.
8. The changes did not completely decompartmentalize the banking system. Barriers
continued to separate long term and other commercial banks and barriers remained between
financial institutions and insurance companies.
9. At least since the 1960s, the Japanese government has encouraged further consoli-
dation in the banking sector. In addition, no new bank has received a license to operate
since the 1950s, with the trust subsidiaries of nine foreign banks the only exception. The
result has been a decline in the total number of banks in Japan.
10. See discussion infra Section IV.
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others such as the consumer sector suffered."
Compartmentalization facilitated this process. Each category of
banks had its prescribed niche in the recovery process. They raised funds
from different sources and funnelled them to designated companies or in-
dustries. Each category of banks found themselves beholden to the gov-
ernment for funds and, concomitantly, more willing to follow the govern-
ment's guidance about the scope and direction of loans.
A. The Early Days
The financial sector evolved contemporaneously with the emergence
of modern Japan and the Meiji Restoration. At the apex of the financial
system rested the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Formed in the 1870s, MoF
represented the single most powerful bureaucracy in a country of power-
ful bureaucracies. In charge of the budget, tax, foreign exchange, customs,
securities activities, insurance companies and banks, the MoF performed
the functions assigned to a dozen agencies and offices in the United
States.'"
Early banking legislation reflected marked outside influence. The ini-
tial pattern was modeled after the national banking system in the United
States.'" Adopted in 1872 and subject to important amendments four
years later, the Bank Act regulated commercial banks and authorized
them to issue currency."'
The legislation initially had little effect; only a small number of
banks formed.'1 Amendments adopted in 1876 sought to encourage the
organization of banks, primarily by doing away with gold denominated
reserve requirements. The amendments accomplished the intended goal,
with 157 banks forming over the next four years.1 6 Some private financial
11. The inability to obtain consumer loans for cars or household appliances further
spurred savings, as did an inadequate system of retirement income.
12. At one time MoF also had control over industry, trade, agriculture, transportation,
communications and supervision of local governments. Those duties were taken away in
1898. See Ministry of Finance, 5 KODANSHA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 186-8 (1983).
13. HUBERT F. SCHIFFER, THE MODERN JAPANESE BANKING SYSTEM 15 (1962). See also
generally Thomas F. Cargill, Central Bank Independence and Regulatory Responsibility:
The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve, 2 MONOGRAPH SERIES OF FINANCE AND ECO-
NOMICS, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1989). (noting that Japanese
system based upon the National Currency Act of 1863 adopted in the United States).
14. WILLIAM WIRT LOCKWOOD, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN: GROWTH AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 1868-1938, at 13 (1954).
15. The law had a number of problems. As one commentator wrote: "First, it made the
notes issued by the National Banks against the collateral of government bonds redeemable
in metal, which, given the public's attitude toward paper money and the deficits and the
current balance payments, made it very difficult to keep the notes in circulation. Second,
the terms of the law did not provide the banks with a sufficient margin of profit." RAYMOND
W. GOLDSMITH, THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1868-1977 (1983).
16. The amendments also lowered the interests charged on borrowed money. National
banks initially had the authority to issue currency. The currency, however, had to supported
by sufficient reserves. By altering the requirement of gold reserves, the Bank Act provided
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institutions also formed during that period. In 1876, Mitsui became the
first private commercial bank and an ordinary commercial bank following
adoption of The Banking Act of 1890.
This early approach to financial regulation, however, ultimately had
to be scrapped. A rebellion in Kyushu demonstrated inadequacies with
the banking system. The government had to increase spending to handle
the emergency, causing rampant inflation. With the need for comprehen-
sive reform clear, the Japanese abandoned the system of national banks
in the 1880s, instead opting for a central banking system based upon the
European model. Specifically, the country focused on the experiences of
Belgium, the country that most recently had set up a central bank.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) came into existence in 1882 and two years
later received the exclusive authority to issue currency.1 7 The government
owned fifty five percent of the central bank's stock and appointed the
Governor, Vice-Governor and a number of other bank officials. The gover-
nor tended to be either a career employee within the central bank, a re-
tired official from the MoF, or a private banker, typically from the YSB.
The modern commercial banking law emerged in 1890."8 Apparently
designed to promote expansion, the Bank Act contained few constraints.19
There were no restrictions on non-banking activities, loan limits, capital
or reserve requirements.2 0 Deposit insurance did not exist. The result was
predictable: rapid growth of rickety financial institutions, an unstable mix
that would haunt the financial system until the war.
21
The number of commercial banks proliferated, at one point climbing
to almost 2,000.22 Most banks were small, with almost half having capital
of less than 100,000 yen.2 3 This number began a gradual decline after the
turn of the century when minimal capital requirements were estab-
considerable impetus for the formation of banks and the issuance of currency. See SCHIFFER,
supra note 13, at 16.
17. The BoJ received the authority with the adoption of the Convertible Bank Note
Act of 1884 (law under which "the authority of such national banks was abolished and all
notes were unified into the Bank of Japan notes."). See also SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 16.
18. FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN [ZENGINKYO], THE BANKING SYSTEM
IN JAPAN 26 (1989).
19. See Recent Developments in Japanese Banking, FED. RES. BULL., July, 1923, at 805
("The reason for the large number of banks to be found in the peculiar banking legislation
of Japan, which, in accordance with the desire of the Government to spread banking facili-
ties all over the country, made the opening of banks dependent upon very few
requirements.").
20. Id.
21. See Fuji BANK, LTD., BANKING IN MODERN JAPAN (2d ed. 1967).
22. The precise number of banks at the turn of the century appears to have been 1867.
See THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 18, (putting number at 1867 in 1901).
23. G.C. ALLEN, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EXPANSION 56 (1965). The largest banks, of course,
had much greater capital. See YASUO MISHIMA, THE MITSUBISHI: ITS CHALLENGE AND STRAT-
EGY 179 (1989) ("In 1915, the capital of the Banking Division [of Mitsubishi] was only Y1
million compared with Y20 million for the Mitsui Bank Y21.5 million for the Dai Ichi Bank
Y10 million for the Yasuda Bank, and Y7.5 million for the Sumitomo Bank.").
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lished, 2 although the total number of branches continued to grow."5
Some of the decline came from bank failures, with 956 becoming insol-
vent between 1905 and 1936.2' Reduction in numbers also resulted from
an increasing number of mergers.27 The larger banks benefitted from the
consolidation process, with deposits and business flocking to healthier fi-
nancial institutions.
The real turning point and the end of atomistic banking occurred
with the panic of 1927. The collapse of the Bank of Taiwan sent shock
waves through the Japanese financial system.2" The Bank had lent con-
siderable sums to Suzuki & Co., the newest industrial group. With Suzuki
tottering, a number of Japanese banks called in short term loans to the
Bank. Unable to raise funds, the Bank of Taiwan turned to the BoJ.
When funds were not forthcoming, the bank collapsed. As one govern-
ment report put it: "This caused great alarm and resulted in runs on
banks throughout the whole country."2 9
With no system of deposit insurance, any threat to the integrity of
the financial sector sparked panic. The failure of the Bank of Taiwan
proved no exception. Depositors began to withdraw funds. The BoJ
pumped money into the system to ensure liquidity, but the need for more
systematic reform was clear.8 0 The government responded with the Bank-
ing Law of 1927.'
The 1927 Law gave the government considerable control over the fi-
nancial sector. All banks operating within the country had to obtain a
license and could not open, close or move a bank branch without approval
of the Ministry of Finance. The Law also attempted to establish a bank-
24. The decree established minimum levels of 500,000 yen for joint stock banks and
250,000 yen for private banks. ALLEN, supra note 23 at 56.
25. By the end of 1920, the number of branches had increased to 5,097. Id.
26. Hugh Patrick, Japanese Financial Development in Historical Perspective, 1868-
1980, in COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES (Gustav Ranis, et al. eds., 1984).
27. Id. at 312 (noting that between 1905 and 1936, 956 banks failed; 1,333 were
merged). But see supra note 19, at 2 ("The collapse of small, unsound banks accounted for a
greater part of the decline, which consolidation was a minor factor.").
28. An earlier run apparently resulted from discussions in the Diet over the govern-
ment's desire to delay payments under guaranties that arose out of the Great Earthquake of
1923. Schiffer, supra note 13, at 20. In addition, competence in the financial system was
shaken by publicity that certain large banks, including the Bank of Taiwan, were unsound
because of a deteriorating loan portfolio. DILEMMAS OF GROWTH IN PRE-WAR JAPAN 247
(James W. Morley ed., 1971).
29. Annual Report of the Bank of Japan, FED. RES. BULL., May 1928, at 331.
30. See id. at 331 ("When the panic broke out, first in March and again in April, we
disregarded our usual practice and gave liberal accommodation to all banks applying for
funds to meet withdrawals of deposits; we extended credits directly and freely even to insti-
tutions which had no previous business connections with us; and in cooperation with the
Government and leading banks we endeavored to tide over the crisis and stabilize the
situation.").
31. The Law was substantially revised in 1981. See The Banking Law, Law No. 59 of
June 1, 1981, Arts. 8 & 9 (Japan).
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ing system based upon short term loans,3 2 by restricting commercial
banks to limited duration loans, leaving long term credit to special insti-
tutions.-3 Additionally, the law imposed limitations on non-banking activ-
ities, although not securities activities.
The Banking Law of 1927 remained in place, without significant
change, until 1981."' The longevity had one major explanation: ambiguity.
The Law contained little more than an outline of a regulatory scheme,
providing MoF with considerable discretion. With little or no regulatory
augmentation, MoF used the 1927 Law to totally reshape the financial
system after the war.
Commercial banking was not the only financial sector to experience
reform and consolidation. The 1920s also saw efforts to reform trust com-
panies. Subject to almost no regulation, trust companies had proliferated.
As with banks, economic uncertainties in the 1920s precipitated a number
of failures. The adoption of the Trust Law and the Trust Business Law in
1922 subjected the companies to extensive regulation. The 1922 Law gave
MoF authority to license trust companies, and was used aggressively to
pare numbers. Most large trust companies formed during this period, in-
cluding Mitsui, Yasuda, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Nippon.3 5 Able to pay
higher yields than banks, the companies thrived. They grew in size and
rivaled the large commercial banks.3 "
Following adoption of the legislation, trust companies witnessed a
dramatic decline in numbers. The number fell from 488 to thirty seven by
1928 and to six by the end of the war.37 The decline in numbers did not,
however, mean a diminishing market share. Quite the contrary. Trust
companies, perceived as a haven from the uncertainties confronting banks
and deposits, actually grew as their numbers decreased. s
32. See Henry C. Wallich, and Mabel I. Wallich, Banking and Finance, in ASIA'S NEW
GIANT 279 (1976).
33. Id.
34. See The Banking Law, supra note 31.
35. Mitsui was formed in 1924; Yasuda and Sumitomo in 1925 and Mitsubishi and Nip-
pon in 1927.
36. See The Capital Market, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN AND KOREA: A
PARALLEL WITH LESSONS 165 (Chung H. Lee and Ippei Yamazawa eds. 1990).
37. See Fujino, A Comparison of Trusts in the United States and Japan, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE REISCHAUER INSTITUTE OF JAPANESE STUDIES 87-17, at 10
(1987).
38. MONEY AND BANKING IN JAPAN, BANK OF JAPAN, ECONOMIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT,
(S. Nishimura trans. L.S. Pressnell ed., 1973). See also Annual Report, supra note 29.
("Following financial panic of 1927, there 'was an active transfer of funds from the second-
ary and minor banks to the larger banks, trust companies, and the Post Office Savings
Banks;"). Three trust companies controlled the bulk of the business. See MISHIMA, supra
note 23, at 253 ("The percentage Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo accounted for among
the total trust properties, also increased from 47% in 1927 to 53% in 1928 and to 54% in
1929.").
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B. Special Banks
In addition to commercial banks and trust companies, the Japanese
financial system rested on a bed of specialized financial institutions. Spe-
cial banks served particular functions such as financial services in occu-
pied territories, foreign exchange, and long term lending to particular seg-
ments of the economy. Special banks represented the priinary vehicles for
government intervention into the financial system.
Representing the first of the special banks, the Yokohama Specie
Bank (YSB), to a large degree set the pattern. The YSB addressed a spe-
cific void in the financial system. Designed to engage in international
trade activity, the bank was intended to weaken the monopoly of foreign
banks over trade finance in Japan.3 9 Formed in 1880, the YSB again
demonstrated the government's willingness to rely on foreign models. The
Bank patterned it's charter after the one used by the Hong Kong &
Shanghai Bank.40 In forming the bank, the government retained consider-
able influence over the institution, appointing the President and Vice-
President,"1 supplying one-third of the bank's initial capital, and provid-
ing advantageous low interest loan financing. "2
The YSB quickly became heavily involved in trade finance, ulti-
mately creating an extensive network of foreign offices. The Bank opened
a London office in 1884 and by 1902 had branches in France, the United
States, India, Hong Kong and China.43 An overseas presence allowed the
YSB to compete with the foreign banks. Particularly during the First
World War, the YSB seized considerable business from European
competitors."
The Hypothec Bank of Japan filled another void in the financial sys-
tem. Authorized to issue long-term debt, the bank primarily made agri-
cultural loans, secured by real property, for terms as long as fifty years.4 5
39. G.C. ALLEN, A SHORT ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN 1867-1937 53 (1962).
See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 15, at 50. The bank received the authority to engage in
foreign exchange activity six years after formation.
40. See FRANK H.H. KING AND CATHERINE E. KING, The Hong Kong Bank in the Period
of Imperialism and War 1885-1918, THE HISTORY OP THE HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK-
ING CORPORATION, 94-96 (1987- 1991).
41. ALLEN, supra note 39 at 53. The only serious competition for trade finance came
from branches of foreign banks. Id. at 108.
42. See SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that 1/3 of initial capital provided by
government with additional funds from Treasury; after government funding ended, Bank of
Japan authorized to make low interest loans).
43. JAPANESE FINANCE DEPARTMENT, AN OUTLINE OF BANKING SYSTEMS IN JAPAN 12
(1905).
44. See FED. RES. BULL., supra note 19, at 804, 806. ("The European war and the fluc-
tuation of most European currency is after the war restricted and hampered to a large de-
gree the activities of the European banking institutions, with the result that their business
was taken over by Japanese banks.").
45. See SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 18. The Hypothec bank could issue long-term debt,
although not in excess of ten times capital.
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The Hypothec Bank could raise funds by issuing debentures but had only
limited deposit taking authority. 4" This restriction on deposits began the
practice of dividing banks by funding source, something that would re-
main an attribute of the post-war banking system.
The Hypothec Bank also worked closely with the agricultural and in-
dustrial banks, a network of agrarian based financial institutions located
in each prefecture.47 Once again, the government retained considerable
control over the bank and guaranteed the dividend payment for the first
ten years of its existence.
Formed four years later, the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) had as
its principal goal the extension of long-term loans to Japanese industry,
typically for five year periods. The IBJ channelled funds to "established
large industries, especially for shipbuilding companies, iron and steel fac-
tories, and public utilities. '4' To obtain the long term financing necessary
for the loans, the IBJ received debenture issuing authority.
In addition to servicing industry, the IBJ to some degree facilitated
foreign investment. A large portion of its capital came from overseas. 49
The bank floated bonds in England and France in 1908 and in New York
in 1924.0 As with the other special banks, the government's guiding hand
was readily apparent, including a dividend guarantee comparable to that
received by the Hypothec Bank."'
Intended to facilitate development of Japan's northern most island,
the Hokkaido Takusiyoka Colonial Bank received debenture issuing au-
thority. The government also formed financial institutions in occupied
territories including the Bank of Taiwan and the Bank of Chosen in Ko-
rea both of which acted as central banks for those areas.52
Special banks maintained close ties with the government. In addition
to dividend guarantees and some financing, MoF typically appointed key
officers.6 3 The banks also performed tasks assigned by the government.
The Bank of Japan conducted activities in overseas territories through
the YSB. MoF, by comparison used the IBJ to implement domestic poli-
cies. Following the great earthquake in 1923, the IBJ at the behest of the
government funneled aid to small borrowers. Similarly, after the financial
crisis of 1927, the government again channeled funds to small borrowers
through the IBJ. At the end of 1929, IBJ had more than Y35 million in
46. Id.
47. ALLEN, supra note 39, at 54. The Hypothec Bank gradually took control of these
banks after 1921, operating them as branches. Id. at 108.
48. SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 18.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Herbert M. Bratter, Japan's Special Bank for Industrial Financing, THE FAR EAST
REV., Oct. 1930, at 574. The article also contains a list of companies financed by the IBJ.
51. ALLEN, supra note 39, at 54.
52. SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 19.
53. ALLEN, supra note 23, at 55.
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loans to "petty merchants and manufacturers. 54
C. Control and Consolidation
In addition to reforming the financial system, the Banking Law of
1927 also accelerated the process of consolidation in the banking commu-
nity. Capital standards were raised and a policy was announced favoring
further "amalgamation" of commercial banks. Over half of the existing
banks did not meet the new capital standards requiring them to either
find the necessary capital, merge or liquidate.55
From a high of almost 2000 banks at the turn of the century, the
number of banks began to fall, a process that accelerated as the war be-
gan.56 The number of commercial banks fell from 683 in 1931 to 377 in
1937 and sixty one in 1945.1' By the end of the conflict, the four zaibatsu
banks, Teikoku (a combined Mitsui and Dai-Ichi), Yasuda (Fuji), Mitsub-
ishi and Sumitomo, held 74.9 percent of all bank loans.58
The trend toward consolidation did not exempt larger banks. Sanwa,
a name meaning three harmonies, formed in 1933 as an amalgamation of
three banks Osaka, Yamaguchi and Konoike.59 Tokai formed in 1941
through the combination of three banks in the Nagoya area. More spec-
tacularly, Mitsui and Dai-Ichi, two of the largest and oldest banks united
under the Teikoku banner in 1943. Nor was the trend limited to urban
centers. MoF continued to push for consolidations outside of cities under
the premise of "One Prefecture, One Bank."'
The consolidation policy was not primarily motivated by efficiency;
control represented the preeminent concern. "The aim was not so much
to consolidate the banks' business as to strengthen financial control, such
as the promotion of the Easy Money Policy, the improvement of govern-
ment bond marketing, and the provision of funds for munitions
industries." '61
54. BRATTER, supra note 50, at 575.
55. JAPANESE FINANCE DEPARTMENT, supra note 43, at 2.
56. Kozu YAMAMURA, ECONOMIC POLICY IN POST-WAR JAPAN 24 (1967).
57. Pressnell, supra note 40, at 26 & 39. Of the five largest banks at the end of the War,
only one, Sanwa, was a non-Zaibatsu bank.
58. Yasuda (1880), Mitsui (1876), Sumitomo (1895), Mitsubishi, and Dai Ichi (1872),
had 28.1 percent of all deposits held by commercial banks in 1930. SCHIFFER, supra note 13,
at 21. See also PATRICK, supra note 27, at 312 (stating that "Big 5" had 30 percent of all
bank loans and deposits by 1930).
59. The bank also ultimately absorbed Sanwa Trust Company.
60. See Takeshi Otsuki, The Banking System of Japan, ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, July 7,
1951, at 521 ("As a result, a financial administrative principle of having only one bank for
each prefecture was set up, and legal measures to facilitate the merger of banks were
adopted."). A number of large banks emerged from the process. Bank of Kobe was formed
in 1936 from a merger of seven banks in Hyogo Prefecture; Saitama in 1943 from the four
largest banks in Saitama Prefecture.
61. L.S. Pressnell, at 38. See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 15, at 118 ("The process of
concentration proceeded through the 1930s and accelerated during the war, being fostered
by the government and becoming practically compulsory during the second half of the pe-
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As the conflict war in accelerated, so did government control over the
banking system. To some degree, the large Zaibatsu banks had repre-
sented counterweights to government influence. They could count on cap-
ital and deposits from member companies and, in an unstable financial
environment, the balance of individual deposits.6" Not dependent upon
the BoJ for funds, these financial institutions had considerable practical
independence from government oversight.63
As Japan shifted to a wartime economy, however, the role of govern-
ment greatly expanded. The government, particularly the MoF, aggres-
sively intervened into the financial markets to pursue war related policies.
Commercial banks became government controlled conduits for funneling
capital to war related industries. The MoF encouraged this process by
guaranteeing loan repayments. While the role of particular banks varied,
the entire financial system generally operated to facilitate the govern-
ment's military exploits. 64
Similarly, the relatively high degree of independence enjoyed by the
BoJ came to an end.6 5 Loss of independence occurred in 1942 with the
adoption of a law acceding to the Ministry the authority to order the BoJ
to implement particular policies.6 In the post-war period, control would
be further tightened through the practice of appointing retired MoF offi-
cials as Governor of the central bank.
Thus, by the time the war ended, certain distinct attributes had ap-
peared that would remain central to the post-war banking system. 7 In-
riod, as the government felt that the financing of rearmament and war could be more effi-
ciently handled by a smaller number of large banks, which could be more easily controlled
by the government.")
62. Samuel E. Neal and Raymond Vernon, Japan Has a Bank Problem, BANKING, Oct.,
1946, at 46 ("And finally the prestige of the Zaibatsu name, bearing with it a reputation for
soundness and stability which carried great appeal for people plagued with bank failures
and defalcations, served the clinch the Zaibatsu position in the competitive race for
deposits.").
63. Some even viewed the Ministry as a captive of the Zaibatsu banks. See id. at 45,
118 ("Until the middle 1930's this control by the Zaibatsu was overt and absolute. The
Finance Minister almost invariably was a career employee of one of the Zaibatsu families.
After 1930, the control of the Ministry by the Zaibatsu was more discrete but hardly less
effective.").
64. For a more detailed discussion of the government subjugation of banks during the
war, see W. TsUTSUI, BANKING POLICY IN JAPAN 13-17 (1988).
65. See TAKAFUSA NAKAMURA, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE ECONOMY 139 (1981) (noting that
prior to the war, "the Bank of Japan had preserved a relatively independent position vis-a-
vis the Ministry of Finance .... ).
66. See Art. 42 of Bank of Japan Law (BoJ "under the supervision of the competent
Minister [of Finance]."). See also RICHARD A. BANYAI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CHINA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING THE JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION 1937-1945 (1974); T.F.M. AD-
AMS & IWAU HOSHiu, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN 99 (1972) (noting the MoF received
authority to approve discount rate and fix note issue limit and to "direct the bank ... to
undertake any business, to change its statutes, or to take any other necessary action.").
67. For a discussion of charges in the financial system immediately before and during
the war, see Yasuo Noritake, The Development of Monetary and Banking System in Ja-
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creasingly, banks became divided by function. Long term banks, foreign
exchange banks and trust companies all performed specialized functions.
At the same time, the financial industry emerged from the conflict highly
concentrated and subjected to considerable government control.
II. REFORM AND THE OCCUPATION
The post-war system of financial regulation can only be understood
in the context of the immense capital shortage that occurred in the after-
math of the Second World War. War-torn, an empire sheared away, Japa-
nese industries confronted the herculean task of rebuilding and con-
verting to civilian production. Doing so required capital; capital that
could not be repaid until retooling had finished and markets
reestablished.
Raising capital posed immense hurdles. With individuals primarily
concerned about food and shelter, the thought of investing limited re-
sources into risky ventures such as corporate stock had little appeal."
The ability to sell stock was also constrained by dysfunctional markets
and the absence of a history of this type of investment. In addition, allied
policies designed to break up the Zaibatsu, the large Japanese industrial
complexes, flooded the market with shares, further crowding out compa-
nies attempting to raise funds.
Still, something had to be done. Japanese companies desperately
needed capital. The primary answer was to be banks. Companies had his-
torically relied on banks for most of their capital needs. Resort to bank
financing in the post-war period was not simply a return to the past. Use
of banks as capital purveyors went well beyond earlier levels. Dependency
upon bank financing evolved into a system of credit rationing and govern-
ment control of industrial policy.
During the occupation, a rigid regulatory structure descended. With
other investment alternatives unavailable, individuals had little choice
but to deposit excess yen in banks. The funds were lent to capital starved
companies. The aggregation of small deposits supplied a significant por-
tion of the capital needs of corporate Japan.
Deposits, however, were not enough. Funds had to come from some-
where else. The solution was to be the government, specifically the Bank
of Japan. Through the discount window, the government provided city
banks with considerable additional funding. The practice, however, also
created leverage. The threat of reduced funding enabled the government
to dictate to banks which companies and industries were eligible for
credit. Control of credit permitted control of industrial policy.
Compartmentalization facilitated control. The financial system con-
pan, 1932-1945, 1 KOBE U. ECON. REv. 69 (1955).
68. See THOMAS PEPPER, MERIT E. JANOW & JIMMY W. WHEELER, THE COMPETITION
DEALING WITH JAPAN 146 (1985) ("World War II and the postwar financial difficulties virtu-
ally destroyed private accumulations of capital in Japan.").
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tinued to divide banks both by source of funding and by function. Com-
mercial banks were meant to be a source of short term financing for Japa-
nese industry, although as a practical matter loans were constantly
renewed. They could not sell debentures or otherwise raise long-term
funds.69 Funds came almost entirely from deposits, with loans from other
financial institutions and the BoJ playing an important role.7"
Special banks were eliminated. In their place however, appeared
three long-term banks. These financial institutions arose out of the need
to provide Japanese businesses with longer term financing. They were al-
lowed to sell debt with maturities of one year or five years and were ex-
pected to provide corporate Japan with financing of a more significant
duration.7 1 The authority to sell bonds came at a price. The banks could
not accept retail deposits.7 2 Given the insatiable need for capital, the
three long term banks had commercial relationships with most, if not all,
of the leading Japanese corporations.
The occupation also saw the creation of additional classes of banks.
Specifically, trust companies were given increased authority and allowed
to operate as banks..7  Trust banks raised funds neither through deben-
tures nor, in significant amounts, through deposits.7 4 Instead, the primary
mechanism was the loan trust certificate, funds left with the bank for a
term of three years at fixed interest rates. The funds were then lent to
industries designated by the MoF, effectively providing another source of
long term financing for corporate Japan.71
MoF also segmented banks geographically. City banks generally
69. See 20 MINISTRY OF FINANCE FINANCIAL HISTORY SECTION, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY
OF JAPAN, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION PERIOD 1945-1952, at 65-66 (1982). As a practical matter,
Japanese commercial banks consistently renewed short-term loans, effectively transforming
them into long-term financing. Id. at 33.
70. Id. The call money market involved short-term loans among banks. To the extent a
financial institution had excess, unused funds, they would lend them to other over-loaned
banks, particularly city banks. The government exercised considerable influence over the
market, including the determination of interest rates. Id. at 68.
71. Long Term Bank Credit Law, Law No. 187 of 1962.
72. Id. at 39. They could, however, accept certain government deposits and deposits
from borrowers. The three long-term banks are the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank. Id.
73. Trust banks are commercial banks with trust authority. Commercial banks received
the authority to engage in trust activities during the war. See Commercial Bank's Additional
Operation of Trust and Savings Bank Business Act, Law No. 43 of 1943. Following the
occupation, however, the Ministry of Finance used administrative guidance to force most
city and regional banks out of the area. That left the trust business to a specialized class of
commercial banks.
74. MoF did this in large part by limiting the number of trust bank branches.
75. Only one city and seven trust banks had the power to manage and invest client
funds, eliminating a source of profits for other institutions. Trust banks also managed pen-
sion plan assets, a lucrative business shared with insurance companies. The seven trust
banks are: Mitsubishi Trust, Sumitomo Trust, Mitsui Trust, Yasuda Trust, Toyo Trust,
Chuo Trust, and Nippon Trust. Daiwa represents the only ordinary commercial bank with
trust powers.
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could expand only in the principal urban centers, particularly Tokyo and
Osaka, and only on a limited basis. Regional banks, typically smaller,
tended to operate in a single prefecture. These banks essentially
amounted to conduits for deposits in less urban areas. Often unable to
find sufficient corporate borrowers, regional banks lent excess funds to
cash starved city banks. City banks in turn lent them to industries desig-
nated by the government.
The post-war system also preserved distinctions between domestic
and international banks. The MoF severely restricted the overseas expan-
sion of Japanese banks. The Bank of Tokyo, the successor to the YSB,
became the only bank registered under the Foreign Exchange Bank Law
and obtained the greatest share of overseas offices." Only the largest city
banks could maintain an international presence, and even that occurred
on a limited scale. MoF did not permit long term or trust banks to go
abroad until the early 1970s.7
7
Finally, commercial banks were prohibited from selling securities, an
activity left to the emerging class of Japanese brokers. With origins trace-
able directly to comparable provisions in the U.S., the ban meant that
banks could not sell stocks or bonds for corporate clients.7 8 The loss of
this potential source of profits made the banks more dependent upon
commercial lending and more susceptible to government control. The re-
strictions also helped stymie development of the stock market and gave
rise to a group of securities firms that would ultimately prove fierce com-
petitors of the banks.
Not entirely a Japanese creation, the system of compartments was
implemented with the explicit support of United States officials running
the country during the occupation. Compartmentalization had a dual pur-
pose. Foremost, it increased competition, a noticeable attempt to undo
some of the concentration in the financial sector that had occurred during
the war.
The other purpose was more subtle. Compartmentalization also facil-
itated credit rationing. Credit rationing allowed funds to be directed to
industries considered by allied officials to have high priority in the eco-
nomic recovery process. The U.S., therefore, encouraged and became at
least in part responsible for the shape of the post-war financial system
and the high level of government involvement in the system.79
76. See discussion infra note 211.
77. Long term and trust banks only began opening overseas branches in the 1970s.
Most were concentrated in New York and London.
78. Although the separation was imported from the United States, the purpose was
entirely different. The separation of securities and banking functions in the U.S. arose in
part out of the belief that the intertwining of the two caused the Great Depression. In Ja-
pan, the U.S. separated the two industries entirely to prevent city banks from monopolizing
the brokerage business, thereby creating an additional class of competitors. See text infra
note 183.
79. Government control was consistent with the articulated SCAP policy first of favor-
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A. The Occupation Descends
The United States initially wanted no responsibility for the economic
and social chaos that followed termination of the war. In line with this
early approach, occupation officials received explicit instructions not to
assume control of the financial system.80 The stated goal of the occupa-
tion was "demilitarization and democracy." Military officials, therefore,
had as a primary purpose the denuding of Japan's means to make war
and transformation of the autocratic government into a democracy. In
other words, the early goals did not include Japanese economic
reconstruction."1
Financial sector oversight fell to the Economic and Scientific Section
(ESS) of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers or, more commonly,
SCAP. ESS had responsibility for oversight of economics, labor, finance,
and science and included "[a]ll of industry, foreign trade, price control,
rationing, antitrust activities, and economic statistics . "..."82 With re-
spect to banking, however, the ESS initially had relatively constrained
authority.
The ESS was to take "no steps to maintain, strengthen, or operate
Japanese financial structure except insofar as may be necessary for
achievement of provisions of this directive."8 Officials could shut down
banks involved in the war efforts but otherwise could do so "only for pur-
poses of introducing control, removing objectionable personnel or taking
measures connected with blocking [the] program, . . ." and were in-
structed to "re-open[] these banks as promptly as possible; . . .84
SCAP, therefore, had been told essentially to leave control of the fi-
nancial system to the Japanese. This meant working closely with the BoJ
ing specified industries critical to the country's recovery and later those promoting exports.
80. JCS 1380/15, paras. 13, 13a, and 35a, cited in THEODORE COHEN, REMAKING JAPAN:
THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION As NEW DEAL 139 (1987).
81. See United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan: SWNCC 150-3,
Aug. 22, 1945, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 70, at 65-66 ("The
policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and con-
fronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is
the direct outcome of its own behavior and the Allies will not undertake the burden of
repairing the damage.").
82. COHEN, supra note 81, at 87. The reach of the Section was extraordinarily broad. As
Cohen noted, "[ilts responsibilities reached into every cranny of Japanese everyday life, and
its chief was pulled into almost every problem of significance." Id. Through most of the
occupation (1946-1952), Major General William F. Marquat headed the Section.
83. Id. The ESS also had the authority to take "such financial measures as may be
deemed necessary" including "[t]he closing of banks."
84. Incoming message WX61967 Washington radio, General Headquarters U.S. Army
Forces Pacific, Adjutant General's office. Radio and Cable Center, SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. (Sept. 9, 1945). See also Monograph No. 39, Money and Banking, GHQ, SCAP, at 1
("The basic Occupation directives required the Japanese authorities, rather than SCAP, to
plan and direct the reform of Japan's banking system so that it could make its full contribu-
tion to the development of a democratic, peaceful and stable economy capable of supporting
the Japanese people and maintaining trade relations with the free nations of the world.").
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and MoF. Officials in the Economic and Scientific Section supported the
approach. They knew that anything foisted upon the MoF without its
consent would be undone as soon as the occupation ended. Cooperation
was therefore deemed crucial.8 5
Day to day oversight remained in the hands of Japanese regulators,
although the Finance Division regularly reviewed and often modified the
actions of the MoF and Central Bank. SCAP occasionally intervened di-
rectly. Occupation officials prohibited mergers absent express approval."6
In the end, however, the Japanese exerted considerable influence over the
direction of financial reforms."
MoF retained its position as the critical voice in the financial mar-
kets in large part due to its deliberate decision to deal with SCAP di-
rectly. Most other ministries relied on the central liaison office, an office
primarily staffed by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who
spoke English. Unwilling to accept them as intermediaries, the proud
MoF instead set up a liaison office of its own. Lacking sufficient staff with
fluency in English, officials were, for the first time, hired laterally.
Equally unusual, MoF agreed to accept a number of personnel who had
not graduated from an Imperial University.8"
MoF, with considerable assistance of the liaison office, retained a
close working relationship with occupation officials.8 9 The liaison made
frequent visits to the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, with
meetings often occurring twice a day. In addition, the Minister of Finance
met with ESS officials on a weekly basis. Interaction between the two
groups was extensive.
[The staff of the Finance Division] had very close contact [with Japa-
nese banking officials]. We saw representatives of the Ministry of Fi-
85. Interview with Tristan Beplat, Chief, Banking Section, ESS (Mar. 1992). One com-
mentator concluded that the decision to leave the Japanese government in place resulted
from "the grossly insufficient number of Japanese-language personnel among the Allied
powers and because of lack of familiarity with Japanese administrative procedures .... "
ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 67 (1970).
86. See Merger of Financial Institutions, SCAPIN 759, Feb. 21, 1946. MacArthur Mu-
seum, Norfolk, Va. (prohibiting any bank merger, consolidation or amalgamation absent
SCAP approval). See also Memorandum from Walter K. LeCount, Chief, Finance Division,
Re: Merger of Seiwan Savings Bank with Aomori Shogyo Bank, To: Ministry of Finance,
004.2 ESS/FIN, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Jan. 29, 1949) (approving merger).
87. See CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982).
88. By the time the war had begun, the practice of accepting personnel almost exclu-
sively from the University of Tokyo had become entrenched. A handful of exceptions to this
practice had occurred, however. Ikeda Hayato, future Finance Minister and Prime Minister,
joined the Ministry of Finance in 1925 after graduating from the law faculty at Kyoto Uni-
versity. Nonetheless, even these exceptions all involved one of the prestigious imperial uni-
versities. The hiring of Gengo Suzuki, who graduated from a University in Taiwan, to work
in the liaison office was an exception even to the usual practice of hiring from imperial
universities.
89. The liaison office was first headed by Takeo Fukuda, who later became Prime Min-
ister, then Nobutane Kiuchi, who later headed the Foreign Exchange Control Board.
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nance, Bank of Japan and the banks everyday. For example, there was
a group in the Finance Division that was responsible for dealings with
the Trust Banks Association .... It was also in the Finance Division a
special section that dealt with the Ministry of Finance. There was a
group that had daily liaison with the Bank of Japan. When it came
time to reorganize the banks, the Finance Division studied every reor-
ganization plan and then went over it again with the Bank of Japan.
Each proposal that came out of the Finance Division was carefully
gone over before it was approved.90
A weekly meeting was also held between the MoF and General Marquat,
head of ESS. 1
The MoF played a critical role in shaping the banking system. Offi-
cials within the ESS relied extensively on Ministry input. This reflected
in part a lack of expertise and part prudence. Any reforms imposed over
MoF's objection would simply be reversed when the occupation ended.
The ESS, therefore, worked hard at devising reforms that gained the ac-
quiescence of the MoF.
Not surprisingly, the system that emerged preserved many pre-war
vestiges. Special banks survived, albeit in a slightly altered form. Despite
their role in the war efforts, the Industrial Bank of Japan and Bank of
Tokyo (ne Yokohama Specie Bank) survived. Concentration remained
pronounced; comprehensive reform of the entire financial system never
occurred.
B. The Penalty Phase
Consistent with the initial approach toward Japan, early banking
polices were largely punitive. Occupation officials wanted to ensure that
the pre-war system in Japan did not return. Initial efforts focused upon
disbanding the institutions associated with the war effort and expunging
the individuals deemed responsible. Elimination of the Zaibatsu freed the
core banks to make loans to companies not in the industrial complex.
92
Occupation officials also closed and liquidated most special banks.
90. THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: ECONOMIC POLICY AND REFORM, (Lawrence H. Redford
ed. 1978) (statement by Tristan Beplat, former Chief of the Banking Section of the Eco-
nomic and Scientific Section of SCAP).
91. Conversation with Gengo Suzuki, Former Chief, Liaison Office, Ministry of Finance,
Tokyo, (Mar. 1992).
92. In November 1945, SCAP approved a plan in which shares owned by the four larg-
est Zaibatsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda, were to be transferred to the Hold-
ing Company Liquidation Committee and ultimately sold. The HCLC did not actually begin
selling the shares until August 1946. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 66, at 23. Teikoku Bank
was the principal bank for the Mitsui Zaibatsu. The bank formed from an amalgamation of
Mitsui and Dai-Ichi banks in April 1943. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 9 n.2. Until
creation of the Commission, the status of designated companies could not change and share-
holders could not sell stock in the companies. Ultimately, several hundred firms were desig-
nated as "Restricted Concerns." ADAMS & HOSHIn, supra note 66. The Commission began
functioning in August 1946, id., and was dissolved five years later. Id. at 24.
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Application of these policies to the financial sector began almost im-
mediately upon cessation of hostilities. By memorandum dated Septem-
ber 30, 1945,ss allied forces announced the closing of "all banks and other
financial institutions whose paramount purpose has been financing of war
production or control of financial resources of occupied territories."''" The
Japanese government received instructions to "immediately close and not
allow to reopen" the designated institutions. The principle officers were
to be "discharge[d] and summarily remove[d] from office. . ."" MoF had
to "present at the earliest possible date proposals for the liquidation of all
closed institutions,"'96 with the BoJ ultimately overseeing the process.9
The unremarkable decision was dramatized by the method used to
publicize the closings. After the business day ended, military personnel
swiftly occupied twenty one Japanese financial institutions, including The
Bank of Taiwan, Bank of Chosen, BoJ, The Hypothec Bank, the YSB,98
and the only two foreign banks remaining in the country.99 The action
occurred without warning; employees were ordered out of the building
without time to clear their desks.100 The occupying forces also prohibited
overseas communication absent their approval, 10 1 cutting off contact with
93. The closing of the financial institutions in the occupied territories was intended to
be the first step in economically separating Japan from those countries. See Cincafpac-Adv.
to Comgen Usafik-Opnl priority, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Sept. 29, 1945) ("At 1600
hours in 30 September CMA wartime finance banks in Japanese branches of foreign banks
CMA including Bank of Chosen and Bank of Taiwan will be closed by direct action of this
headquarters PD you should insure adequate publication in Korea to emphasize the closing
of Japanese branches of Bank of Chosen is an integral part of the program to separate
Japanese and Korean economy and to divert Japanese of all control over Bank of Chosen
and its assets PD you should keynote the fact that the closing of Japanese branches will
improve the position of the Bank of Chosen in Korea.").
94. Extract of Allocation of Staff Responsibilities for Execution of JCS Directives, SS
Responsibilities in Japan, SCAP Records, Suitland Md. (Mar. 4, 1947). See also Draft Fi-
nancial Directive for Japan, inter-office communication (for information), Treasury Depart-
ment, from Mr. White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Secretary Vinson, Aug. 28,
1945, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 69, 2-23, at 143.
95. Closing of Colonial and Foreign Banks and Special Maritime Institutions, SCAPIN
74, Sept. 30, 1945. MacArthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. See also Supplemental Instructions
pertaining to the Closing of Financial Institutions, SCAPIN 104, Oct. 8, 1945. MacArthur
Museum, Norfolk, Va. (detailing practices with respect to employees of closed institutions).
96. Oral Instructions Given to Ministry of Finance on 30 Sept. 1945, SCAPIN 73 Mac-
Arthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. (Sept. 30, 1945). See also Appointment of a Liquidator of
Branches, SCAPIN 163 MacArthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. (Oct. 20, 1945) (appointing BoJ
as liquidator of closed institutions and directing prompt submission of plan of liquidation).
97. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 15 (noting that by beginning of 1946, BoJ
had become fiscal agent for all closed institutions).
98. Lindesay Parrott, Americans Sieze 21 Banks in Japan and Oust Officials, N.Y.
TIMES., Oct. 1, 1945, p.1, col.8, cont'd at p.6 col.5. For a complete list of the financial institu-
tions closed, see SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 35 n.19.
99. These included the German Deutsche Bank and the Banque Franco-Japonaise, a
Vichy controlled bank, Id. at p. 6, col. 5.
100. JUSTIN WILLIAMS, SR., JAPAN'S POLITICAL REVOLUTION UNDER MACARTHUR: A PAR-
TICIPANT's ACCOUNT 6 (1979).
101. McArthur Extends Curbs on Finance, N.Y.TMES., Oct. 4, 1945, p. 8, col.3.
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correspondent banks and branches located abroad.'02With one swift act,
remaining international operations of Japanese banks ended.
Most of the seized banks were simply liquidated. The YSB, however,
presented a more complex concern. Complicity in the war effort was clear.
During the conflict, the bank became an active participant, advancing the
government interests. Foreign branches "operated under the direct con-
trol of the local military administration . . .",03 Moreover, the bank had,
in the words of occupation officials, "become the principal instrument in
the Government's complicated system of currency manipulation in occu-
pied countries."'"
The bank's international operations, however, played a unique role in
the financial system. The YSB had an extensive overseas network, with
branches in Asia, Europe and the United States. No other Japanese bank
had anything comparable. Moreover, unlike the other special banks
closed by SCAP, the YSB had a significant domestic presence. The Japa-
nese government, therefore, lobbied hard to save the bank.
The circumstances surrounding the attempted closing of the YSB il-
lustrated the often successful tactics used by the MoF to ameliorate occu-
pation policies designed to restructure the financial system. Often un-
happy with approaches developed by SCAP, MoF first tried to delay
implementation. Officials usually engaged in a lengthy debate over the
practicality of a particular policy. They sometimes asserted that various
legal and other barriers prevented execution. Either way they bought
time. Gradually, SCAP abandoned the offensive policy or, in the case of
the YSB, accepted cosmetic changes.105
At the behest of the Japanese government, SCAP temporarily ex-
empted the YSB from the mandatory closings. Thereafter, what to do
with the YSB caused much bureaucratic teeth gnashing, something that
caught the attention of the State Department.'" On the one hand, occu-
pation officers were committed to the elimination of all special banks. On
the other, they were concerned about the impact on the economy of any
untoward activity."
102. MacArthur Extends Curbs on Finance, N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 4, 1945, p. 8, col.3. Most
of the occupied financial institutions never reopened.
103. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 4. Although not a government bank, the YSB
had played an important official role during the war, handling many of the Bod's functions
in the occupied territories, see BANYAI, supra note 66, at 8; see also PEPPER, supra note 68,
at 147 n.7.
104. The currency manipulations in part enabled the Japanese to fund the cost of the
military occupation.
105. In general, SCAP in the financial area tried to convince rather than impose. Inter-
view with Sherwood Fine, Head of Finance Division, SCAP (Nov. 1991). This provided con-
siderable room for negotiation.
106. See Incoming Message From War Dept., to CINCFE, NR W 86092, Sept. 12, 1947.
SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. ("State Dept. Inquires Re: Status Yokohama Special Bank
Report Requested").
107. SCAP officials from the Finance Division wanted to eliminate the final vestiges of
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
MoF ultimately prevailed. The MoF submitted a liquidation plan for
the YSB in April 1946 that called for the transfer of YSB assets to a new
financial institution. SCAP modified the plan by imposing a number of
cosmetic steps, including the requirement that the resulting bank operate
under a new name bearing no resemblance to the YSB.0 s SCAP also pro-
hibited certain YSB officials from associating with the new institution.10 9
The modified reorganization plan effectively preserved the domestic
assets of the YSB, but in a newly formed entity.110 The Bank of Tokyo
(BoT) emerged from the reorganization as an ordinary commercial
bank.""' The BoT, however, still had the most significant international
experience of any Japanese bank. When the banks returned abroad, the
BoT would be at the forefront, acting as the country's principal interna-
tional agent. 2
Occupation officials, however, made certain that the BoT had no mo-
nopoly over foreign operations by carefully preserving the right of other
banks to engage in overseas activities.' " Moreover, personnel of the de-
funct YSB had scattered among the other banks, ultimately becoming the
nucleus of their international departments. Nevertheless, through the
1970s, the BoT remained the top Japanese international bank, receiving
preferential treatment from MoF in the realm of oversees expansion.
the special banking system that existed prior to the war. See Memorandum from Walter K.
LeCount, Chief, Finance Division to Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP Records,
Suitland, Md. (July 28, 1948) ("It is agreed that the special bank system should be elimi-
nated at the earliest practicable opportunity .... This can be accomplished by each of the
now existing special banks [reorganizing as ordinary commercial or debenture-issuing
banks]."). Moreover, allied officials did so only after determining that reorganization would
have little harmful effect on the financial markets. Id. ("It is not contemplated that this
program if undertaken will have an appreciable effect on the total amount of credit
available.").
108. See Dissolution Plan for Yokohama Specie Bank, SCAPIN 1049 (July 2, 1946),
MacArthur Museum, Norfolk, Va. ("The name of the new institution will bear no similarity
either in Japanese or in foreign translation, to that of the Yokohama Specie Bank.").
109. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 16 (noting that directors and executive
officers of new bank could not be persons associated in similar capacities with YSB since 7
July 1937 or subject to purge).
110. Completion of the liquidation of the YSB apparently did not occur until 1949. See
Dissolution Plan for the Yokohama Specie Bank, SCAPIN 1049/1 MacArthur Museum,
Norfolk, Va. (June 28, 1949) (terminating "Trust Relationship" between YSB and BoJ).
111. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 18. The BoT opened on Jan. 4, 1947. Id.
According to Tristan Beplat, the government submitted a whole list of names, with BoT
ultimately selected.
112. See discussion infra text accompanying note 211.
113. See Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, to W.J.
Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, (undated), SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. ("The Yoko-
hama Specie Bank, Ltd., which had monopolized the Japanese Foreign Exchange Business,
had been placed in liquidation prior to the reorganization of the other Special Banks. To
avoid further monopolistic controls by any one institution, plans were made at that time
whereby all Japanese banks properly staffed with foreign exchange specialists would take
over would take over the foreign exchange functions at such time as SCAP would authorize
the reopening of the foreign exchange business.").
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III. FROM PUNISHMENT TO PRESERVATION
A. Firm Financial Footing
Early policies focussed on closing banks and purging officials. By the
middle of 1946 SCAP underwent a pronounced shift in approach. Puni-
tive oriented reform shifted to preservation. The banking sector had
emerged from the war in a precarious state. 14 Without a more benevolent
approach, instability in the financial system likely would impede eco-
nomic recovery.
Bank balance sheets brimmed with worthless assets. Following the
end of the war, they had incurred "the loss of overseas assets, the losses
arising from insurance cancellation on fire and bomb-damaged plants,
and attendant losses following the Japanese surrender."1 5 Lavish loans to
munitions and other "essential" industries during the war remained un-
paid. The banks also held debentures issued by the Wartime Finance
Bank, a lender of last resort for military oriented businesses, with repay-
ment guaranteed by the government."'
The government had agreed to indemnify the banks in the event of
default. By the war's end, claims reached Y25 billion."' Payment, how-
ever, would have resulted in economic disaster. Resorting to the printing
presses to create yen needed for repayment threatened to stoke already
high inflation. Payment also had an unsavory flavor, giving the appear-
ance of rewarding those banks that had financed the war effort. 1
To put the banks on a more sound financial footing, occupation offi-
cials wanted to eliminate the indemnification payments. The Japanese
government fought the proposal. Non-payment appeared to renege on
prior commitments.' 9 Tanzen Ishibshi, the Finance Minister, opposed
the plan, particularly when occupation officials insisted that cancellation
be at Japanese initiative. His efforts irritated SCAP and contributed to
the decision to have him purged later that year. 2 '
114. R. FEAREY, THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN SECOND PHASE 1948-50, 67 (1950) ("These
[zaibatsu] Banks, with a total of about 800 branches through-out Japan, have not been bro-
ken up, mainly because of the injury to the stabilization and recovery programs which their
dissolution would have entailed.").
115. See Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (undated).
116. ALLEN, supra note 23, at 63.
117. Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 20. Others put the figure at three times that
amount. See Memorandum from R. Fearey, Division of Japanese Affairs, to H. Borton, Divi-
sion of Japanese Affairs, Oct. 14, 1946, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra
note 82, at 689 ("The Japanese Government had obligated itself by July, 1946 to indemnify
individuals and corporations for various types of war losses to a total of 75 billion yen.").
118. See, e.g., Memorandum to H. Borton, supra note 117, at 689-90.
119. Opposition arose out of both a desire to make good on prior commitments and a
desire to continue to pump money into the economy. See TsuTsuI, supra note 65, at 28.
120. Interview with Takeshi Watanabe, Former Chief, Liaison Office, Ministry of Fi-
nance, Tokyo (Mar. 1992).
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MacArthur and his staff remained adamant about cancellation of the
indemnity payments. As a compromise, occupation officials allowed the
guarantees to remain in place but imposed a 100 percent tax on amounts
paid.' The net effect was to render the indemnification payments worth-
less.122 With the stroke of a pen, the assets of most banks evaporated.
That left the problem of repaying depositors.
SCAP solved the concern by essentially confiscating deposits. Prior
to indemnity tax implementation, SCAP officials froze yen deposits in ex-
cess of a family allotment, 23 affecting approximately forty percent of all
deposits.124 The deposits were used to offset elimination of the indemnity
payments.
The Law for the Reconstruction and Reorganization of Financial In-
stitutions in October 1946125 required banks to accurately value assets
and to submit to the government a reorganization plan. 2 6 Banks had to
write off loans made to insolvent companies and worthless overseas in-
vestments but could deduct the losses from profits, capital, frozen depos-
its and, if necessary, free deposits.127 Thus, banks expunged assets and
eliminated comparable liabilities, emerging as much smaller but sounder.
With the balance sheets relatively clean, the banks were now in a
better position to contribute to the country's economic recovery. As part
of the reorganization and a symbolic break with the wartime era, most
changed their names. 2 ' While some took back their original appellation
after the occupation, Daiwa 2 9 and Fuji' 30 did not.'
B. Deconcentration
With banks on a firmer financial footing, and the problem of special
bank taken care of, SCAP turned to the matter of competition. The de-
121. See War Indemnity Special Measures Law, Law No. 38 of 1946; see also Mono-
graph No. 39, supra note 84, at 20.
122. Not completely, however. Because of exemptions from the tax, Y18 billion was in
fact paid as indemnities. See Fuji, supra note 21, at 191.
123. Withdrawals from the accounts had essentially been blocked since issuance of the
Emergency Financial Measures Ordinance in February 1946. Under the Ordinance small
amounts could be withdrawn each month.
124. See TSUTSUI, supra note 64, at 30.
125. Law for the Reconstruction and Reorganization of Financial Institutions, Law No.
39 of Oct. 1946.
126. Id. art. 39.
127. Only a handful of banks needed to dip into free deposits. Rather than let this
occur, the government paid these amounts. See Letter from W. F. Marquat, supra note 117.
("A government indemnity was given to those banks unable to absorb the final loss by 100%
reduction of the capital account and the old account deposits, the amount of the indemnity
being based upon the difference between the total asset loss and the total capital account
and deposit reduction."); see also Fuji, supra note 21, at 191-92.
128. Mitsubishi for example became Chiyoda Bank.
129. Known as Nomura Bank before the war.
130. Known as Yasuda Bank before the war.
131. PEPPER, supra note 68, at 147 n.6.
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struction of the Zaibatsu left the core Japanese banks largely unaffected.
While some had changed their names and had high ranking officials
purged,'8 2 the banks largely remained outside the early restructuring of
the economy, despite obvious levels of concentration."'8 To some degree,
they even received preferential treatment. This could be seen most clearly
with the adoption and execution of the two laws designed to promote
competition: The Anti-Monopoly Law and the Deconcentration Law.
The Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and
Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of 1947, or the Anti-Monopoly Law,
attempted to ensure competition among Japanese companies.8 4 To pre-
vent recurrence of the Zaibatsu, the enactment barred corporations from
owning shares of one another, essentially outlawing holding companies. 3'
The law also imposed a number of specific restraints on banks, including
a prohibition on interlocking directors.
In general, however, banks received less onerous treatment than
other industries. Exempted from the prohibition on stock purchases, -they
could own up to five percent of the shares of other companies, although
not financial institutions."8 6 The ability to acquire the shares solidified
relationships with Japanese companies and facilitated the rise, of the
kieretsu system.- 7 According to at least one SCAP official, this result was
not foreseen.'
The first case brought under the Anti-Monopoly Law was against fi-
nancial institutions. On December 22, 1947, the Commission ordered
twenty seven financial institutions in the Tokyo area to "abolish the
132. See Law for Termination of Zaibatsu Family Control, Law No. 2 of Jan. 7, 1948;
see also Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 23 ("Under this law all bank officials were
screened and if they had exerted controlling power on behalf of the Zaibatsu's interest, they
were removed from office and barred from key positions for ten years.").
133. The six largest banks, including the four Zaibatsu banks, made 30 percent of all
commercial loans by private banks. See ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1948.
134. Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and Methods of Preserving
Fair Trade, Law No. 54 of Apr. 12, 1947.
135. Originally, the Law banned corporate ownership of shares entirely, excepting only
banks. This harsh and unworkable requirement ultimately had to be modified. ADAMS &
HOSHII, supra note 66, at 25. The law was amended in 1949 to do away with the prohibition
on intercorporate stockholdings. See The Anti-trust Monopoly Law, Law No. 214 of June
18, 1949. See also HADLEY, supra note 85, at 198.
136. See Article 11 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, Law No. 214 of 1947 ("Any company
whose business is financial shall not own stocks in a company with which it is competing
and which operates in the same field of financial business. No company whose business is
financial and whose total assets (excluding unpaid-up capital stock, unpaid-up partnership
share or claims rights) exceed five million (5,000,000) yen shall acquire stock of another
company in case, by doing so, it holds in excess of five percent (5%) of the total issued stock
of said company."), reprinted in YAMAMURA, supra note 58, at 204-205. The percentage was
later increased to ten percent, id, and returned to five percent in the 1970s.
137. The decision to permit bank ownership of shares in non-financial companies has
been criticized. See HADLEY supra note 85, at 187 ("The toleration of bank holdings in in-
dustrial, commercial, and mining companies was unfortunate,...").
138. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
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agreement on interest rates," a practice that had been going on since
before the war."3 9 At least with respect to deposits, control over rates
transferred to the government with the adoption of the Temporary Inter-
est Rate Law. 4"
Preferential treatment for Japanese banks became more clear, how-
ever, with the implementation of the Law for the Elimination of Exces-
sive Concentration of Economic Power, better known as the Deconcentra-
tion Law. 1 ' The law slated the largest Japanese firms for break-up. 4 "
Administration of the law ultimately fell to the Holding Company Liqui-
dation Commission (HCLC)1 3 Although covered by the explicit terms of
the Act, banks were in practice exempted.
The treatment of the banks under the Law was brought to MacAr-
thur's attention in late 1947. In addition to other objections, Prime Min-
ister Katayama requested that MacArthur exempt banks.'4 4 Although re-
assuring the Prime Minister about the affects of the law, MacArthur
refused the request.
[s]ince a blanket exemption of such [banking] institutions from the
dissolution program manifestly could be construed as tantamount to
preserving one of the major influences from which stemmed the pre-
war monopolistic and militaristic controls, the adoption of your rec-
ommended procedure is inadvisable. The impact of reorganization
upon economic recovery is to be a primary consideration in the reor-
ganization planning for each institution, including financial, and
therefore there should result no serious interference with normal fi-
nancing methods. Further, wholly owned government institutions are
not to be included in the deconcentration program."18
The General had spoken, the issue was closed. The Deconcentration Law
would not exempt banks. MacArthur confirmed the position in a radio
message to the Department of the Army the following January.1 48
With the Law in place, SCAP officials discussed what to do with the
banks. Considerable sentiment within SCAP supported the break-up of
the large banks. Only sixty one commercial banks remained after the war.
Even more concentrated than the statistic indicated, seven banks, includ-
139. Shunsaku Nishikawa, The Banking System: Competition and Control, JAPANESE
EcON. STUD. 3 (Spring 1974). The agreement involved the determination of maximum rates
paid to depositors and charged to borrowers.
140. The Diet adopted the law in direct response to the case. Id.
141. Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power, Law No.
207 of Dec. 18, 1947.
142. For a copy of the law, see THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN, supra note 81, 6-30, at
386.
143. Supra note 142.
144. Letter from Tetsu Katayama to Douglas MacArthur, SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. (Sept. 4, 1947).
145. Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama, SCAP
Records, Suitland, Md. (Sept. 10, 1947).
146. HADLEY, supra note 85, at 163.
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ing those from the defunct Zaibatsu, controlled the vast majority of bank-
ing business.
One proposal was to divide the country into three regions (Tokyo,
Osaka and Northern Japan) with prohibitions on bank expansion into
more than one area. The approach amounted to an import from Ger-
many, where the country had been divided into three separate regions. As
military officials went from Germany to Japan, they brought their occu-
pation experiences with them. 4" Other proposals were more blunt. They
simply wanted the larger banks dismantled. One called for the subdivi-
sion of the banks into "no less than two and no more than three separate,
independent banks.""' 8
None of these proposals ever saw the light of day. A fierce bureau-
cratic struggle occurred within SCAP over the proper treatment of Japa-
nese banks under the Deconcentration Law. In general, the Antitrust and
Cartels Division wanted to divide the Japanese banks, something vigor-
ously opposed by the Finance Division. Welsh, Chief of the Antitrust and
Cartels Division, constantly reminded General Marquat, head of the Eco-
nomic and Scientific Section, of his obligations to subject banks to review
under the Deconcentration Law." 9 To Welsh and others in the Antitrust
Division, concentration threatened to handicap the nascent development
of democracy. 15 0
Welsh, however, ultimately lost, with Marquat siding with the Fi-
nance Division.'15 The General opposed the break-up and favored propos-
als designed to exempt them from the auspices of the HCLC.15 2 The deci-
sion arose out of SCAP's fears over the continued solvency of financial
147. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
148. HAMM, DECONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER. JCS 1380/15, paras 13, 13a, 35a,
quoted in COHEN, supra note 80, at 24.
149. See, e.g., Memorandum from Edward C. Welsh, Chief, Antitrust and Cartels Divi-
sion to Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Apr. 26,
1948) ("SCAP is operating under basic directives (ref. JCS 1380-15, FEC 014, FEC 015)
which state: 'You will require plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking
combines .... (and) .... you will establish and maintain surveillance, until satisfactory
plans for reorganization have been approved over (such) Japanese businesses.' ").
150. Conversation with Eleanor Hadley, Former Official, Antitrust and Cartels Division,
ESS (June 26, 1991). She indicated that some within SCAP had the fear that high concen-
trations of wealth would impede the development of democracy.
151. Some have criticized the division of authority over banks between the two Sec-
tions. See id. at 72.
152. See Memorandum for the Record, Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP
Records, Suitland, Md. (Apr. 18, 1948) ("The General [Marquat] stated that necessary steps
should be taken to dissolve such concentrations of power but that this did not necessarily
require a breaking up of the banks themselves. He said that the operating structure should
be looked into on this basis. He further stated that such action should be taken immediately
to clarify the bank situation so that an announcement may be made in the near future to
the effect that banks designated under the deconcentration law have been divested of any
excessive concentration of financial control and were no longer subject to the provisions of
the act.").
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institutions.15 3 As one SCAP document noted:
Breaking up these banks [Yasuda, Teikoku, Mitsubishi, Sanwa and
Sumitomo] would be almost certain to cause a loss of public confi-
dence. Division of these banks would produce a group of smaller
banks, the deposits in each of which would be insufficient to serve
adequately the loan requirements of large borrowers. The ratio of
money on deposit to money in circulation is already low. Breaking up
these banks would further aggravate this condition. Moreover, each of
these banks is now under-capitalized and is faced with the necessity of
raising additional equity capital. A break-up would increase the diffi-
culties of attracting this capital.'"
With these concerns in mind, SCAP announced that banks would be ex-
empt from application of the Deconcentration Law.' 55 To pay lip service
to the legislation, however, allied officials required banks to take steps to
eliminate "those characteristics which tend to classify them as excessive
concentrations of power."' 56 In practice, however, that amounted to little.
The exemption from the Deconcentration Law did not go unnoticed.
The banking sector remained highly concentrated, generating criticism.
157
The criticism engendered an almost defensive tone from SCAP officials.
[Ilt must be pointed out and emphasized that the development of
large banks, (as well as small banks) based on sound banking princi-
ples and appropriate controls, is most essential in any modern econ-
omy. The objective is not to limit the development of properly man-
aged institutions - be they large or small. The aim since the
inception of the bank reorganization program has been the elimina-
tion of malpractices of all banks. The concept that an institution is
evil merely because it is large is rejected. As an economy expands -
as the tempo of recovery is speeded up with the accompanying in-
crease in the size and activity of its component parts, it is necessary,
normal and desirable that financial institutions serving that economy
153. HADLEY, supra note 85, at 242.
154. Memorandum from Roy S. Campbell, Deconcentration Review Board to SCAP
(July 2, 1948), SCAP, reprinted in THE FINANcil HISTORY OF JAPAN supra note 81, 6-37, at
403.
155. YAMAMURA, supra note 58 ("In July, 1948, SCAP announced that the former
Zaibatsu banks would be excluded from Law 207 [the Deconcentration Law], since, as SCAP
stated, these banks had been divorced from the holding companies and were then in the
purview of the Anti-Monopoly Act.").
156. Memorandum from W. F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, for E.
C. Welsh, Chief, Antitrust and Cartels Division (May 7, 1948), SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. The memorandum further required that "the banking institutions will submit plans for
accomplishment of the above objectives, upon acceptance of which they will be free to con-
tinue operation without being subject to further reorganization under provisions of the
deconcentration law." Id.
157. See Memorandum from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section of
SCAP, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Mar. 4, 1950) ("[That] Japan had 71 ordinary banks
having deposits of Y 705,564 million (Jan. 1950) of which ten banks controlled approxi-
mately 63 percent, as of 1 February 1950, would appear to compare favorably with respect
to both a dispersion of economic power and fair inter-bank competition.").
VOL. 21:2
JAPANESE BANKING REFORM
should correspondingly develop in size and ability to serve the ex-
panded requirements.6 8
Despite the controversy, SCAP never seriously reconsidered the posi-
tion. '5 The big banks remained big.
IV. COMPARTMENTALIZATION
The fight over application of the Deconcentration Law was not the
last word. Even those officials opposing breakup remained committed to
increased competition. With only a small number of commercial banks,
something had to be done. 60 The Finance Division within SCAP made
the deliberate decision to lessen the influence of the small number of big
banks by encouraging the recovery of a handful of additional financial
institutions and by creating new classes of competitors.
Increased competition had a number of justifications. Despite the
success in saving banks from the Deconcentration Law, SCAP officials
were quite aware that a small number of large banks was prone to govern-
ment manipulation. Competition also promised to ensure a more equita-
ble distribution of loans. Despite elimination of the Zaibatsu, banks con-
tinued to favor preexisting clients and former members of the industrial
groups.
By creating a new class of competitors, SCAP hoped to provide a
source of lending not beholden to these relationships. Unlike the pre-war
Zaibatsu banks, the new classes would have no preexisting business rela-
tionships. Those borrowers not in a Zaibatsu could therefore turn to the
new banks for credit. This was particularly important given the difficul-
ties confronted by small businesses obtaining loans.'
Increased competition was also expected to benefit the city banks.
With other sources of capital, the multitude of companies from a former
Zaibatsu no longer had to look exclusively to the group's lead bank for
158. Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (undated).
159. See Memorandum from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section,
SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Mar. 4, 1950) ("Reference is made to an article contained in
the Nippon Times of 2 March 1950 (copy attached) in which it was reported that, at the
108th meeting of the Allied Council, the British Commonwealth member made the following
statements: (a) that his Mission has information that eight of Japan's banks 'control 80% of
the industrial and economic life of this country.' (b) that SCAP 'may have' dissolved the
Zaibatsu but (he asked) whether if (destroying one evil) another one - the bank's - had been
established.").
160. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 30 (noting that in 1949, the ten largest
banks were Fuji, formerly Yasuda (186 branches); Teikoku (100 branches); Dai-Ichi (81
branches); Bank of Tokyo (39 branches); Chiyoda, formerly known as Mitsubishi (158
branches); Tokai (205 branches); Daiwa, formerly known as Nomura (101 branches); Sanwa
(194 branches); Osaka, formerly known as Sumitomo (159 branches); and Kobe (166
branches).
161. See, e.g., Memo from R. E. Phillips, Credit Policy Unit, Finance Division, ESS, Re:
Foreign Trade Financing, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Oct. 9, 1947).
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financing. Not representing the exclusive source of financing for all of the
companies within the industrial complex, city banks could concentrate on
particular industries and particular lenders.
1 6 2
Simply creating additional financial institutions was not, however,
enough. The size and dominance of the city banks meant that new enti-
ties could be easily elbowed aside. SCAP, therefore, embarked on a delib-
erate policy of compartmentalizing the banking system. This essentially
involved the walling off of different areas from encroachment by the city
banks. Under the tutelage of SCAP, city banks found that they could not
engage in securities activities, have trust departments, or sell debentures.
Compartmentalization ensured survival; companies or banks performing
these tasks did not have to fear absorption and domination by the large
commercial banks.
The broad approach of creating new competitors had to overcome the
stiff opposition within the MoF. 6 3 In general, MoF's goal was to oppose
further concentration. Since the 1920s, MoF had been engineering a re-
duction in the number of banks. Ultimately, however, the MoF accepted
compartmentalization, in part because the practice enhanced bureau-
cratic authority.
The first public statement promoting an increase in the number of
competitors apparently emerged from the report of the Edwards Mission.
More formally labeled the State-War Mission on Japanese Combines, the
group consisted of representatives of a handful of agencies and depart-
ments (and one law professor). They descended on Japan in 1946, primar-
ily to study the Zaibatsu. Among other things, the Mission recommended
that "the number of independent sources of credit should be increased
substantially. ... "16" The only specific example provided in the report,
however, was divestiture of banks forcibly amalgamated by the govern-
ment and the division of the largest banks.
ESS accepted the recommendation but not the method of implemen-
tation. Instead of downsizing existing banks, SCAP favored the creation
of new classes of financial institutions. Occupation officials, therefore,
continuously looked for ways to increase the number of participants in
the financial sector. Conversion of savings into commercial banks and the
expansion of the number of regional banks all facilitated competition.165
162. See Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section (undated). SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. ("The in-
crease of the number of independent sources of credit has broadened the borrower's choice
of selection among the lending institutions. This has made it possible for the large banks,
including the former Zaibatsu banks, to better serve basic industries through being relieved
of the necessity of servicing the numerous industrial affiliates formerly controlled by
Zaibatsu interest.").
163. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
164. See Policy on Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan, Report of
the Mission on Japanese Combines, May 12, 1947, reprinted in THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
JAPAN, supra note 81, at 350, 355.
165. Letter from W.F. Marquat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section to the Hon.
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Teikoku Bank, formed through an amalgamation of Mitsui and Dai-Ichi
Bank in 1943, dissolved in October 1948, generating two additional finan-
cial institutions.16 6
International operations represented another area affected by
SCAP's pro-competition policy. Elimination of the Yokohama Specie
Bank paved the way for other Japanese banks into the international
arena. SCAP, however, went to great lengths to ensure that the newly
formed BoT and small handful of city banks did not obtain a strangle-
hold over international activities.'
67
The Japanese government divided banks into two classes. Class A
banks could engage directly in international activities by entering into
correspondent bank relations and opening accounts with foreign financial
institutions. Class B banks, in contrast, had to operate through those in
Class A.' The classification, therefore, amounted to a limitation on the
scope of international activities.
MoF initially attempted to limit those in Class A to eight city banks,
five from the defunct Zaibatsu. SCAP, however, would have none of that.
Designation of Japanese financial institutions as foreign exchange banks
required SCAP approval, providing considerable leverage.1 9 To address
the concerns, MoF added four other banks to the list. 7 0 Occupation offi-
cials also contemplated that, as Class B banks obtained international ex-
pertise, they would move to Class A.'
7
'
Trust activities represented another area compartmentalized as a re-
sult of efforts by SCAP. In the aftermath of the war, trust companies had
largely seen their business evaporate and their assets become worthless.
1 7 2
W.J. Sebald, Chief, Diplomatic Section, (undated). SCAP Records, Suitland, Md.
166. HADLEY, supra note 85, at 119.
167. See, e.g., Memorandum attached to letter from W. F. Marquat, Chief, Economic
and Scientific Section, to The Honorable W. J. Seabald (undated). SCAP Records, Suitland,
Md. ("The Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., which had monopolized the Japanese foreign ex-
change business, had been placed in liquidation prior to the reorganization of the other
Special Banks. To avoid further monopolistic controls by any one institution, plans were
made at that time whereby all banks properly staffed with foreign exchange specialists
would take over the foreign exchange functions at such time as SCAP would authorize the
reopening of foreign exchange business.").
168. KEN BIEDA, THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 147 (1970).
169. See, e.g., Memorandum from Chief of Fund Section, Account Bureau, Board of
Trade to Mr. Cleveland, Fund Control Division, ESS, GHQ, SCAP, BOTA # 8825-11-25,
SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (Aug. 17, 1948) (requesting approval for designation of Hok-
kaido Colonial Bank as foreign exchange bank).
170. Bank of Kobe, Daiwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Nippon Kangyo Bank were all added
at the behest of SCAP officials, THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, supra note 90, at 238. Trust
banks and a number of regional banks were also encouraged by SCAP to become Class B
foreign-exchange banks. Id. at 234 n.48.
171. This amounted to another example of wishful thinking. Once the occupation en-
ded, international expansion remained a monopoly of the Bank of Tokyo and a small num-
ber of city banks, much the way it had been before the war.
172. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 23 ("A large part of their portfolios
consisted of securities issued by closed institutions, restricted corporations and special ac-
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Post-war inflation and a prohibition on securities activities further evis-
cerated their business.7 8 The companies also suffered from the entry of
commercial banks into the trust business during the war.
To ensure solvency, SCAP wanted MoF to increase the powers of the
trust companies by allowing them to engage in banking activities.7 "
SCAP officials ran into a brick wall, with MoF resisting the entreaties.
The MoF wanted the large city banks to absorb the trust companies,
eliminating them as a separate class of institutions.'" The Banking Bu-
reau stonewalled, claiming that legislative changes by the Diet were nec-
essary to implement the plan.
176
With an impending change of personnel at SCAP, however, the Min-
istry had a change of heart. The replacement might not be so accommo-
dating or might insist on unacceptable terms. The Director General of the
Banking Bureau suddenly announced that in fact, MoF had the adminis-
trative authority to extend banking powers to trust companies. With a
wave of the wand, the SCAP reforms were implemented and trust compa-
nies received banking powers.1 7 Six of seven trust companies reorganized
as banks with one opting to become a securities firm.1
7 8
Acceding banking powers to trust companies did not guarantee sur-
vival. The possibility that city banks would dominate the trust area still
remained a concern. Occupation officials encouraged MoF to force com-
mercial banks out of the trust business. 7 9 Furthermore, at SCAP's insis-
tence, trust banks received the authority to issue long term loans. Compa-
nies flocked to the new banks in search of financing.
Finally, the separation of banking and securities functions further il-
lustrated to the compartmentalization process. Adopted during the occu-
pation, Section 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law prohibited banks
from selling stocks, bonds and other securities. The separation repre-
sented an oddity with broad consequences.
Unable to sell corporate stock or debt, banks lost an obvious revenue
source. That in turn solidified dependence upon the BoJ as a source of
counting companies and the utilization of these securities was for all practical purposes
impossible.").
173. See Monograph No. 39, supra note 84, at 26. The prohibition was contained in the
Securities Transaction Law of 1948. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 66, at 109.
174. Beplat, supra note 85, at 239.
175. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
176. B.C. KOH, JAPAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 208 (1989).
177. Beplat interview, supra note 85.
178. Sumitomo (Fuji Bank and Trust Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Mitsui (Toyo Bank and Trust
Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Mitsubishi (Asahi Bank and Trust Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Yasuda (Chuo
Bank and Trust Co., Aug. 2, 1948); Dai-Ichi (Dai-Ichi Bank and Trust Co., July 12, 1948);
and Nippon (Nippon Bank and Trust Co., July 12, 1948).
179. See FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 18, at 15, ("After the war,
however, the GHQ and the Ministry of Finance intervened with the policy that once again
separated banking and trust businesses.").
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funds. 80 The separation also deprived financial institutions of any incen-
tive to encourage companies to pursue alternative capital sources such as
the sale of stock. The elimination of banks from the securities markets
retarded development of the stock market and contributed to an immense
concentration in the brokerage community."'8
The separation, at first blush, seemed to have an ethnocentric expla-
nation. The United States had in place a comparable requirement. Con-
gress separated securities and banking functions in 1933, having con-
cluded that the Great Depression resulted at least in part from risky
securities ventures by banks. In fact, however, article 65 arose not out of
a desire to replicate the extent regulatory system in the United States,
but to increase competition.'8 2 Prohibiting banks from engaging in securi-
ties activities guaranteed that an independent class of brokers firms
would emerge. The plan worked with unparalleled success. By the 1970s,
brokers had become so successful that they rivaled commercial banks in
financial and political power, generating considerable conflict. '
Occupation officials also approved the division of banks on the basis.
of short term and long term lending capacity, although only after a num-
ber of embarrassing shifts in policy. The three pre-war debenture issuing
banks, Hypothec Bank, Hokkaido Colonial Bank, and the Industrial
Bank of Japan (IBJ), were initially slated for closing.' 3 SCAP had little
interest in preserving the special authority of these institutions. Deben-
ture issuing banks designed primarily to provide long term financing also
seemed unnecessary. Occupation officials expected an invigorated stock
market to eliminate the need for a special class of banks designed to more
long term loans.'8 4
After some thought and government opposition, SCAP decided
against liquidation. Upon "mutual agreement," SCAP gave the banks the
180. Depriving banks of authority to underwrite was also consistent with the separation
of long and short term financing. Permitting involvement in the sale of corporate securities
would have resulted in the anomalous situations of commercial banks prohibited form mak-
ing long term loans but permitted to facilitate long4erm financing through the sale of corpo-
rate stocks and bonds.
181. Four brokerage firms ultimately monopolized the market: Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko
and Yamaichi.
182. Beplat interview, supra note 85. See also FEDERATION OF BANKERS AssOCIATION,
supra note 18, at 16 ("The law was based on a desire to protect and strengthen Japanese
securities companies .... ").
183. See Memorandum from J.R. Allison, Director of Finance (acting), to Chief, Eco-
nomic and Scientific Section, SCAP Records, Suitland,. Md. (Mar. 29, 1950) "the initial ap-
proach toward the debenture issuing banks from 1945 was directed toward necessary re-
forms to be applied to the Japanese banking structure - designed to eliminate malpractices
and control devices. FEC 230, 12 May 1947, 1 12d states: 'the functions and powers of spe-
cial banks should be defined and limited by law and these banks should not be allowed to
engage in ordinary banking. The need for the existence of the special banks should be re-
viewed in order to determine whether certain of these banks might not revert to the status
of ordinary banks.' ").
184. See Pressnell, supra note 38, at 204.
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choice of reorganizing either as a long term or a commercial bank.'85 In
1948, the Hypothec and Hokkaido Colonial Bank converted to ordinary
commercial banks while the IBJ opted for bond-issuing powers. Viewed
as a transitory measure,186 SCAP expected the IBJ to eventually convert
to an ordinary commercial bank."8 '
When the stock market did not recover Japanese companies, desper-
ate for capital, began to look increasingly to commercial banks. The weak
state of Japanese industry made the loans unattractive. As MoF officials
noted:
Private financial institutions lately are showing a strong tendency to
limit lending to relatively large enterprises in order to avoid troubles
and risk in giving loans to petty business. Such a tendency can be
seen even in small-scale local banks. In spite of the fact that our coun-
try's industrial structure is founded largely on the basis of small and
medium height and size enterprises and farming, forestry and fishing
industries also are operating, in the main, on a small scale, and most
of them are worthy of continued existence, they have been neglected
by financial institutions and been suffering from shortage of money.' 88
For banks to provide capital in necessary quantities, two things had to
occur: they needed funds beyond what could be generated through depos-
its and they needed increases assurances of repayment.
To alleviate the risk and encourage lending, the BoJ provided an im-
plicit guarantee of repayment. To the extent funds went to appropriate
companies, the central bank stood ready to repay in the event of default.
Banks no longer had to worry about risks associated with an uncertain
economy. These policies encouraged banks to step up lending activities. '
The next problem was funding. The deposit base proved inadequate.
185. See Memorandum from Walter K. LeCount, supra note 87, (discussing options of
special banks; to be given choice of reorganizing as ordinary commercial bank or as a deben-
ture issuing corporation).
186. Id. ("Under the prevailing conditions of the debt issuing market, the idea also is
considered inadvisable in relations to the supply of long-term industrial funds. For these
reasons, it is believed advisable to adopt such transitory measures as will be enumerated
below, so that the Industrial Bank may be allowed to bolster its functions as a deposit bank
under certain restriction and at the same time authorized for the time being to issue its
debenture.").
187. See, e.g., Letter from H. Ichimada, Governor, Bank of Japan to General W.F. Mar-
quat, Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, (July 16, 1948) SCAP Records, Suitland, Md.
("Although it is believed advisable for the Industrial Bank of Japan to develop itself into an
ordinary bank in the future, considerable difficulties will have to be encountered in materi-
alizing such a plan all at once today in view of the present conditions of the same bank.").
188. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FIN., ON SOME MEASURES FOR CORRECTING THE CURRENT
TIGHTNESS IN MONEY MARKET, SCAP Records, Suitland, Md. (1948).
189. The over loan situation had also been a characteristic of the financial system in
the early Meiji era. By the end of World War I, however, Japanese commercial banks were
no longer dependent on loans from the BoJ. As one writer described, the banks viewed
dependence on the central bank as "shameful." YOSHIO SUZUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 9 (1980).
VOL. 21:2
JAPANESE BANKING REFORM
SCAP knew about the shortage of yen and favored giving all commercial
banks the authority to issue debentures.1 90 Adopted in 1950, the Law
Concerning Debenture Issues of Banks did exactly that. 9 1 The Law theo-
retically ended the pre-war distinction between short and long term
banks. With the simultaneous abolishment of special banks,'2 Japan
temporarily had "an undifferentiated system of commercial banks. '" '
The legislation did not work as expected. Although permitted to is-
sue debentures, most commercial banks did not.19 4 Moreover, dependent
on deposits and other short term sources of funding, commercial banks
were increasingly asked to absorb greater amounts of long-term debt.195
This threatened to cause financial instability.
In response, SCAP shifted gears. Rather than leave long-term lend-
ing to the banking system as a whole, occupation officials opted for a class
of banks specifically for that purpose.'9 6 Taking the steps required a
somewhat embarrassing policy shift. After all, the decision essentially res-
190. See Marquat Letter, supra note 113 ("The inception of this program [the Dodge
line] brought into sharp focus the shortage of any urgent necessity for a most substantial
volume of long-term credit. The generation of an increased long-term capital funds can most
properly an expeditiously be implemented through full employment of bank debentures.
Accordingly, legislation is currently before the Diet authorizing all banks to issue deben-
tures up to 20 times capital.").
191. Most of the bonds were purchased by the BoJ. See SCHIFFER, supra note 13, at 75.
192. The adoption of the Law Abolishing the Hypothec Bank of Japan Law etc., in
1950 permanently ended the system of special banks. See Pressnell, supra note 38, at 48.
193. NAKAMURA, supra note 65, at 140.
194. See Pressnell, supra note 38, at 205 (noting that debentures were issued only by
the Nippon Kangyo Bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank,
the Central Co-operative Bank of Agriculture and Forestry, the Central Bank for Commer-
cial and Industrial Co-operatives and the Bank of Tokyo). See also G.C. ALLEN, JAPAN'S
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 44 (1958) ("It is true the legal distinction between those banks and the
ordinary banks was destroyed in 1950 when all banks were given the right of issuing deben-
tures within certain limits. In practice, however, the privilege was exercised only by three of
the former Special Banks, and by them only because the government subscribed to there
stocks and debentures form the United States Aid Counterpart Fund and from the Treasury
Deposits Bureau.").
195. See Memorandum from Joseph M. Dodge to Major General W.F. Marquat, Re:
Banking and Bank Credit - Private Debt - Capital Funds Availability, SCAP Records,
Suitland, Md. (Nov. 29, 1950) ("The normal and establisher specialized banking mecha-
nisms for supplying long-term credit (viz., Industrial Bank and others) largely had been
eliminated and the banking system reduced solely to one of commercial banks, the latter
had been forced to absorb a larger amount of long-term credit than their fundamental sta-
tus should require.").
196. By the end of 1950, Dodge had come around to this view. See Memorandum from
Joseph M. Dodge to Major General W. F. Marquat, Re: Industrial Financing, SCAP
Records, Suitland, Md. (Dec. 3, 1950) ("I believe that it is generally agreed among the Japa-
nese financial officials and authorities that there is a need in Japan for the Industrial Banks
to resume its exclusive functions of industrial financing of a long-term nature .... I have
told Mr. Ichimada, the head of the Industrial Bank, and Mr. Ikeda that if the idea of re-
establishing this bank as exclusively a long-term loan bank is valid and the initiative for this
move was to come from them rather than from us, I believe it might receive favorable
consideration.").
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urrected the carefully and deliberately eliminated "special banks. 1 97
Nevertheless, economic exigencies and Joseph Dodge compelled the re-
turn of long term banks. 9
Under the auspices of SCAP, the Diet adopted the Long-Term Credit
Banks Law in 1951. The law provided for a class of long term banks to
provide capital needs of companies. Commercial banks simultaneously
lost the power to issue debentures.1 99 The IBJ predictably chose to organ-
ize as a long term bank. The IBJ had been acting in that capacity since
the end of the war.
The other two pre-war banks with debenture issuing authority, the
Nippon Kangyo Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, opted to remain
ordinary commercial banks. They did, however, assist in the formation of,
and contribute assets to, the Long-Term Credit Bank, with Nippon
Kangyo Bank essentially contributing its investment banking operations.
The Nippon Credit Bank, the last of the long term banks, emerged five
years later out of the remnants of the Bank of Chosen to provide capital
for smaller companies.
00
- V. THE AFTERMATH
The immediate post-occupation period saw a flurry of legislation rati-
fying existing division within the banking system. Tilting to reality, the
government codified the de facto distinction between long term and com-
mercial banks.2 ' The Long-Term Credit Law of 1952 authorized desig-
nated banks to issue five year bonds and one year discounted deben-
tures.202 Only banks organized under the law could issue the debt.
197. See id. ("If I am correctly informed, I believe the change of [the Industrial Bank
of Japan's] functions from industrial financial banking was at least partially initiated by this
headquarters. That places us in a somewhat embarrassing position of having to reverse a
previous action, if this is to be done.").
198. Dodge, a Detroit banker, had been sent to Japan to devise a strategy for returning
the country to a sound economic footing. The so called "Dodge Line" called for, among
other things, a balanced budget, something that remained in place until the mid-1960s. See
generally COHEN, supra note 80, at 431.
199. With city banks no longer having the authority to issue debentures, they were
dependent for financing on deposits, loans from other banks and the government. The gov-
ernment did not let them down. The BoJ expanded credit to banks by 60%. COHEN supra
note 80, at 438. As Cohen noted, without the overloans, "Japanese business would have been
left gasping like fish washed up on the beach." Id.
200. YOSHIO SUZIKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 102 (1980). In addi-
tion to government ownership of shares, capital for the bank came from assets of the liqui-
dated Bank of Chosen. The Bank had a slightly different purpose than the other long term
banks. "[T]he chief business of this bank is the supply of equipment funds and long-term
working capital secured by mortgages to small enterprises." Id. at 104.
201. Extending debenture issuing powers to all banks simply did not work. The IBJ did
issue debentures and make long term capital loans, much as it had before the war. Most
other banks failed to take advantage of the authority. Only the Nippon Kangyo Bank, the
IBJ, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the BoT and a handful of specialized institutions is-
sued debentures under the law. See supra note 200, at 128.
202. The BoT eventually received the authority in the 1960s to issue debentures with
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Legislation in the immediate post-occupation period also confirmed
the position of trust banks. With the revival of investment trusts (mutual
funds), trust banks were allowed to act as trustee, a highly lucrative posi-
tion."' 3 More importantly, the Diet adopted the Loan Trust Law author-
izing the banks to collect long term funds (two to five years) to make
loans for a specified purpose.2 0 4 Loan trust certificates resembled certifi-
cates of deposit, something city and regional banks could not issue for
almost 30 years. MoF, of course, carefully controlled the loans, insuring
proper direct flow to "critical industries," 08 primarily shipping, electric-
ity, coal, iron and steel .2 " By 1962, trust banks also received the author-
ity to manage pension plan assets
s
.
2 0
The 1950s also saw completion of the process of separating trust and
commercial banking activities, something begun during the occupation.2 0 8
Four city and seven regional banks had continued to engage in trust ac-
tivities.2 0 9 Although "encouraging" commercial banks to divest their trust
activities since 1954, the Banking Bureau within the MoF ordered com-
plete separation by city banks only as the decade ended. By 1966, the last
redoubts among regional banks disappeared.
210
No legislation decreed the separation. Quite the contrary. City banks
received express authority to engage in trust activities through legislation
adopted during the war. That mattered little to MoF. Trust banks needed
protection. Divestiture also tightened MoF's grip over the banking sector.
Deprived of trust activities, commercial, particularly city, banks lost an-
other source of revenue. This made them even more dependent upon
lending activities and, concomitantly, borrowings from the BoJ.
The early post occupation years also saw the codification of the pre-
eminent international position of the BoT. The Foreign Exchange Bank
Law of 1954 provided for a specially designed foreign exchange bank, pri-
marily for export financing. The law was adopted with the expectation
that only the BoT would register. Having absorbed much of the staff of
the YSB, the BoT presented the only Japanese bank with the expertise
maturity of three years. For a brief discussion of debt issuing authority by long term banks,
see TAKEDI YAMASHITA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 160 (1989).
203. The resurgence of the investment vehicles coincided with the adoption of the Se-
curities Investment Trust Law in 1951.
204. Funds raised under the Loan Trust Law were deposited for a fixed period of time.
With minimum deposit amounts of 10,000, the principal and interest of the deposits were
guaranteed. See ADAMS & HosHII, supra note 66, at 111.
205. See NAKAMURA, supra note 65, at 141. See also Pressnell supra note 38, at 225.
206. SUZUKI, supra note 200, at 114 (plan of trust property administration must be sub-
mitted to MoF for approval); see also Pressnell, at 226 (noting that at one time MoF had
restricted loans to industries other than those five).
207. ADAMS & HOSHII, supra note 66, at 110.
208. Beplat interview, supra note 85; See also THE BANKING SYSTEM supra note 18, at
15 ("After the war, however, the GHQ and the MoF intervened with a policy that once again
separated banking and trust businesses.").
209. THE BANKING SYSTEM, supra note 18, at 15.
210. Id.
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and depth capable of handling extensive international activities.
By the early 1950s, the BoT had already begun spreading abroad.
The bank had offices in New York, London, California, India and Paki-
stan."1 Designation under the law ensured favorable treatment in open-
ing overseas branches. The MoF also used the bank as an agent for vari-
ous activities abroad. In committing to the international arena, however,
BoT paid a price. Domestic operations were restricted with the bank
forced to close all offices not related to trade finance.
VI. THE PRESENT
Despite some initial opposition, MoF came to agree with SCAP's vi-
sion of the banking system, although with a twist. While originally prefer-
ring increased consolidation, the MoF gradually recognized the value of a
compartmentalized financial sector. The functional divisions gave each
category of banks a particular niche in the financial system, something
that appealed to MoF's sense of order.
Not coincidentally, compartmentalization also increased MoF's abil-
ity to control activities in the financial markets. City banks could not
regain the size and influence of the old Zaibatsu banks, making them less
capable of standing up to MoF influence. In addition, by dividing banks
on the basis of funding, they became dependent upon the government
largess, particularly the BoJ, for additional funds to lend.
MoF used the control to maintain order throughout the financial sys-
tem. Relying upon "administrative guidance" or informal advice, the
MoF insisted that banks pre-clear all major developments.2 1 2 This gave
MoF extraordinary power to control the course of events before they oc-
curred, an opportunity MoF used with vigor. Most notably, MoF invoked
guidance to force commercial banks out of the trust business notwith-
standing express legal authority to emerge in the activity.
Banks followed MoF advice in part because they feared the conse-
quences of not doing so. Primarily through the power to approve or disap-
prove the establishment of new branches, the MoF had the ability to
limit the expansion of recalcitrant banks.2 Daiwa Bank suffered exactly
those consequences after refusing to follow Ministry guidance and divest
211. Interview with Seishichi Itoh, Senior Managing Director, Bank of Tokyo, Tokyo
(Mar. 1992).
212. In Japanese the phrase is gyosei shido. See Allan D. Smith, The Japanese Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labyrinth
and the Castle, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 417, 418 n. 6 (1984); see also Yoriaki Narita,
Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45, 54 n. 13 (1968) ("Fundamentally, circulars are
employed as a means of direction and supervisor over interior administrative structure, but
they are also issued to inform juristic persons and associations outside the administrative
structure as to definitive matters."). For a legal discussion of the subject, see Young, Judi-
cial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute
Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 953 (1984).
213. See The Banking Law, supra note 31.
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trust activities.214
The banks accepted the stifling degree of administrative control not
only out of fear. A broad consensus existed within the banking commu-
nity and society as a whole that government manipulation of the financial
system to promote economic growth was acceptable. More to the point,
banks flourished under the system.
In return for regulatory submissiveness, financial institutions re-
ceived assured profitability. By restricting available alternative invest-
ment vehicles, individuals had little choice but to deposit surplus funds
with banks. Controls on interest rates ensured depositors an anemic re-
turn. With loan demand kept high, particularly through restrictions on
other types of corporate borrowing, and cost of funds low, Japanese banks
had no difficulty turning a profit.2"5 Even the risks associated with high
levels of corporate borrowing were ameliorated by implicit repayment
guarantees."'
Through the 1990s, little was done to alter this basic framework. Re-
forms occurred in each decade, but they amounted to mere refinements
rather than wholesale revisions.1 Compartmentalization seriously eroded
only with the adoption of reforms in 1992 and only after MoF determined
that segmentation no longer had the same benefits.
The more modern story of the decompartmentalization process war-
rants a story in and of itself. For one thing, the domestic process of
achieving a consensus on the changes entailed an eight-year struggle that
essentially involved a pitched conflict between banks and securities firms.
Brokers rightfully feared that banks, with their close relationships to cor-
porate Japan and extensive branch networks, would provide considerable
competition for securities business.
214. Daiwa's president refused to give up the trust activities, apparently feeling that
they were too critical to.the bank's future. The validity of his reasoning aside, the practical
effect was that he resisted the guidance of the Ministry. Daiwa's approach was not well
received. Future branch applications received a cold shoulder. Daiwa was also effectively
excluded from the Loan Trust Law and appartenly had difficulties getting approval for
branch licenses. The message was clear: ignore the Ministry's guidance at great peril.
215. The system also provided other advantages. As Chalmers Johnson has noted, em-
phasis on lending as the primary source of profits also imposed on banks considerable incen-
tive to uncover growth companies that would provide new sources of loans. JOHNSON, supra
note 87, at 206.
216. James C. Abbelgan & William V. Rapp, Japanese Managerial Behavior and 'Ex-
cessive Competition'. 8 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 430 (Dec. 1970). MoF's control also
extended to the BoJ. Legislation passed during the war gave MoF explicit authority to re-
view the actions of the Central Bank. See Bank of Japan Law, supra note 66. In practice,
however, the authority was never invoked. Control also emanated from the practice of hav-
ing a retired ministry official serve as Governor of the Central Bank every other term.
217. The 1950s saw the addition of reserve requirements; the 1960s laws facilitating
mergers; and the 1970s the inclusion of a deposit insurance scheme. Even in 1980, when the
Banking Act was amended comprehensively for the first time since 1927, the changes did
little to alter the basic regulatory scheme. See generally FRANCIS McCALL ROSENBLUTH, FI-
NANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (1989).
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Foreign pressure also played a significant role in the reforms. As a
result of government pressure, primarily from the United States, foreign
banks were, in the mid-1980s, allowed to engage in trust and securities
activities. They permanently fractured the symmetrical system of bank-
ing compartments. With the changes, extension of comparable authority
to Japanese banks became a foregone conclusion.
The reforms will also, over the long term, impact the relationship
between the MoF and the private sector. In the short term, deregulation
will, ironically, enhance MoF authority. MoF has made clear that the
decompartmentalization process will be carefully managed. While banks
will have the authority to engage in securities activities, initially they will
be limited to primary offerings of debt securities, and they will not be
able to underwrite equity securities or engage in stock brokerage
activities." '1
MoF also imposed firewalls designed to separate the securities sub-
sidiary from the parent bank. This included restrictions on the bank per-
sonnel that could work for the subsidiary and limits on the exchange of
information between the two entities. The securities subsidiary could not
operate out of the headquarters of the bank. Finally, city banks could not
set up a subsidiary for the first year after the effective date of the law,
giving an advantage to trust and long term banks.2 19
With respect to trust bank subsidiaries, banks and securities firms
were allowed to engage in certain designated money trusts. They were,
however, barred from the most lucrative areas, particularly pension
trusts. MoF also imposed firewalls separating the trust subsidiaries from
the parent bank or securities firm.2"'
These restrictions will likely end over time. Until then, however, the
legislation has given MoF additional leverage. Banks and securities firms
seeking expanded authority will need to maintain strong relations with
the Mof and to observe the government's guidance.
Over the long term, however, decompartmentalization will result in a
reduction in MoF control over the financial system. Banks will have
greater operating latitude, capable of obtaining profits from a more di-
verse group of activities, including trust and securities activities. They
will also have additional funding sources, particularly loan trust certifi-
cates. When the decompartmentalization process has been completed,
banks will also end up with some type of bond issuing authority.
All of this will reduce bank dependency on government policies. The
218. Additional restrictions also apply. Initially a securities subsidiary will not even be
able to lead manage a debt offering where the company has less than Y500 billion in net
assets and the parent was the commissioned bank during the previous two years. See JAPA-
NESE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM,
PROVISIONAL UNOFFICIAL SUMMARY, (Dec. 1992).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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additional funding sources will reduce dependency on branch license and
borrowings from the BoJ, two important sources of government leverage.
Additional activities will reduce the need to follow government guidance
in order to ensure adequate levels of profitability.
More intriguing, the growing strength of city banks, a trend arrested
by the occupation-inspired policy of segmentation, may resume. Whether
through competition or acquisition, city banks will have the wherewithal
and the contacts to make considerable inroads into other segments of the
financial markets. 2 ' Some classes of banks, trust banks, for example, may
disappear altogether.
As the size and strength of city banks grows, they remain less perme-
able to MoF influence. Indeed, they may actually emerge as effective
counterweights to MoF authority, a function similar to the one served by
the Zaibatsu banks before the war. The net effect would be a fundamen-
tal realignment in the role of the government in the financial markets.
221. While MoF currently opposes acquisitions, this clearly does not apply in the con-
text of an ailing bank or broker. City banks may be allowed to acquire existing entities if,
necessary to stave off insolvency.
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